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Executive Summary 
 
This submission draws upon research done in relation to the Trans-Pacific Partnership and 
tobacco control – including: 
 
Matthew Rimmer, 'Price and Trade: World No Tobacco Day 2015', (2015) 24 Tobacco 
Control e123-124. 
 
Matthew Rimmer, 'New Zealand, Plain Packaging, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership', 
InfoJustice, 28 March 2014, http://infojustice.org/archives/32570 
 
Matthew Rimmer, 'Ireland, Plain Packaging, and the Olive Revolution', InfoJustice, 24 March 
2014, http://infojustice.org/archives/32484  
 
Matthew Rimmer, 'The High Court of Australia and the Marlboro Man: The Battle Over The 
Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products', in Tania Voon, Andrew Mitchell, and Jonathan 
Liberman (Ed.) Regulating Tobacco, Alcohol and Unhealthy Foods: The Legal Issues, 
London and New York: Routledge, 2014, 337-360. 
 
Matthew Rimmer, 'Plain Packaging for the Pacific Rim: the Trans-Pacific Partnership and 
Tobacco Control', in Tania Voon (ed.), Trade Liberalisation and International Co-operation: 
A Legal Analysis of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Cheltenham (UK) and 
Northampton (Mass.): Edward Elgar, 2013, 75-105. 
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Matthew Rimmer, 'Cigarettes will Kill You: The High Court of Australia and the Plain 
Packaging of Tobacco Products' (2013) 1 WIPO Magazine 20-23 
http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2013/01/article_0005.html 
 
Becky Freeman, Simon Chapman, and Matthew Rimmer, 'The Case for the Plain Packaging of 
Tobacco Products' (2008) 103 (4) Addiction 580-590. 
 
There have, of course, been some important resolutions in the final text of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, after extensive negotiations over the topic of tobacco control. The issue remains 
problematic. Rather than provide for complete protection of tobacco control measures, the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership instead offers limited and partial protection, particularly in respect 
of Investor-State Dispute Settlement. There is still scope for state-to-state dispute resolution in 
respect of tobacco control under the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The text reaches quite an 
uneasy compromise in the end on intellectual property, trade, and tobacco control. 
 
Recommendation 1 
Countries across the Pacific Rim should support and implement the WHO 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. 
 
Recommendation 2 
Countries involved in the Pacific Rim should follow the lead of Australia, and 
adopt graphic health warnings, and the plain packaging of tobacco products. New 
Zealand and Canada have been pressing ahead with such tobacco control 
measures, given the evidence from Australia about the efficacy of the regime. 
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Recommendation 3 
The Australian Government has successfully defended plain packaging of 
products, both in a constitutional case in the High Court of Australia, and in an 
investor-state dispute settlement matter with Philip Morris. The Australian 
Government is currently defending plain packaging of tobacco products in the 
World Trade Organization. Australia has made a strong case about the legitimacy 
of tobacco control measures – such as plain packaging of tobacco products – under 
international law. 
 
Recommendation 4 
There is a need to protect tobacco control measures from possible intellectual 
property challenges under the Trans-Pacific Partnership, given Australia’s past 
experiences in domestic litigation and in the World Trade Organization. 
 
Recommendation 5 
There is a long history of tobacco companies deploying investor clauses to 
challenge tobacco control measures – such as graphic health warnings and plain 
packaging of tobacco products. The Trans-Pacific Partnership provides protection 
against investor actions in respect of tobacco control measures – but only if nation 
states elect to do so. A broader exclusion for tobacco control would have been a 
better approach. Overall, it would have been preferable to excise the regime on 
investor-state dispute settlement from the Trans-Pacific Partnership altogether. 
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Recommendation 6 
There have been concerns about how Technical Barriers to Trade will operate in 
respect of tobacco control measures under the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 
 
Recommendation 7 
There remain larger concerns about the use of State-to-State dispute resolution in 
respect of tobacco control measures under the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 
 
Recommendation 8 
The World Health Organization remains concerned about how tobacco companies 
have sought to deploy intellectual property, investor clauses, and trade agreements 
against public health measures. 
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Plain packaging for the Pacific Rim – tobacco control and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(2013) 
Matthew Rimmer 
 
Kids today don’t just start smoking for no reason. They’re aggressively targeted as customers by the 
tobacco industry. They’re exposed to a constant and insidious barrage of advertising where they live, 
where they learn, and where they play.1 (United States President Barack Obama) 
 
Introduction 
 
Big Tobacco has been engaged in a dark, shadowy plot and conspiracy to hijack the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and undermine tobacco control measures – such as 
graphic health warnings and the plain packaging of tobacco products. The tobacco industry has 
long considered the use of trade agreements as a means of delaying, blocking and frustrating 
the introduction of tobacco control measures.2 In the 1990s, internal documents highlight that 
the tobacco industry considered whether the use of trade actions under the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) may delay the introduction of measures, such as the plain packaging of 
tobacco products. However, there was an admission in the internal memos that such action 
                                                          
1  President Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President’ (Speech delivered at the signing of the Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, White House Rose Garden, 22 June 2009) 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-family-smoking-prevention-and-
tobacco-control-act>. 
2  Becky Freeman, Simon Chapman and Matthew Rimmer, ‘The Case for the Plain Packaging of Tobacco 
Products’ (2008) 103(4) Addiction 580. 
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would provide ‘little joy’ for the tobacco companies.3 A number of countries allied to the 
tobacco industry have challenged Australia’s plain packaging of tobacco products regime under 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)4 and the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.5 British American Tobacco has lobbied the United 
States Trade Representative on intellectual property and trade.6 In the course of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)7 discussions, British American Tobacco argued: 
‘We would strongly advocate tobacco and tobacco products being prioritized in the course of 
the negotiations when specific areas of concern are being addressed.’8 
The TPP is a blockbuster, plurilateral free trade agreement, spanning the Pacific Rim.9 
There has been concern that tobacco companies have been seeking to use this trade agreement 
                                                          
3  British American Tobacco, DB Presentation to GM’s Conference (21 July 1994) Legacy Tobacco 
Documents Library <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/hpp34a99>. 
4  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 
1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) annex 1C (‘Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights’). 
5  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 
1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) annex 1A (‘Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade’). 
6  See, e.g., Office of the United States Trade Representative, Vol. 1 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
Public Comments (7 August 2008) 18.  
7  Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, signed 1 October 2011, [2011] ATNIF 22, not yet in force. 
8  Office of the United States Trade Representative, above n 6, 18. 
9  See Enhancing Trade and Investment, Supporting Jobs, Economic Growth and Development: Outlines 
of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (November 2011) Office of the United States Trade Representative 
<http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/outlines-trans-pacific-partnership-
agreement>; The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Negotiations, Australian Government, Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade <http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/tpp/index.html>. For an overview, see Ian Fergusson et 
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to undermine tobacco control measures – such as graphic health warnings and the plain 
packaging of tobacco products – and the implementation of the WHO Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control.10 Philip Morris made a submission to the United States Trade 
Representative on the TPP, emphasising: ‘We strongly support U.S. participation in the TPP 
negotiations, and welcome the future expansion of this initiative to include additional countries 
in the Asia-Pacific region.’11 The company has even sponsored a trade reception, involving 
many of the participants in the negotiations.12 The treaty negotiations have included members 
of the Pacific Rim – such as Australia, New Zealand, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Vietnam, Peru, Chile, Canada, Mexico and the United States. In April 2013, Japan was 
included in the TPP negotiations.13 Thailand has been approached by the United States 
Government to join the negotiations. In this context, there has been concern about the extent to 
which tobacco control measures of negotiating nations will be affected by the TPP (see Table 
5.1). 
 
                                                          
al., ‘The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress’ (CRS Report for Congress No R42694, 
Congressional Research Service, 15 April 2013) <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42694.pdf>. 
10  WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, opened for signature 21 May 2003, 2302 UNTS 166 
(entered into force 27 February 2005).  
11  Philip Morris International, Submission No USTR-2009-0041-0016 to Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, Request for Comments Concerning the Proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Agreement, 22 
January 2010, 2. 
12 Hayden Donnell, ‘Ambassador to US “Should be Sacked”‘, The New Zealand Herald, 27 February 2012 
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10788367>. 
13 Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘Obama Administration Notifies Congress of Intent to Include 
Japan in Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations’ (Press Release, 24 April 2013) <http://www.ustr.gov/about-
us/press-office/press-releases/2013/april/congressional-notification-japan-tpp>. 
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Table 1. World Health Organization Tobacco Control Profiles for Participants in the TPP 
Country Ratification of 
WHO Framework 
Convention on 
Tobacco Control 
Adult 
Prevalence, 
Smoking 
Current 
Health 
Warnings 
Health 
Warnings 
Include 
Picture or 
Graphic 
Plain 
Packaging 
United States Not Ratified 27.0%  Yes Yes No 
Canada 26 November 2004 19.5% Yes Yes No 
Mexico 28 May 2004 15.9% Yes Yes No 
Peru 30 November 2004 NA Yes Yes No 
Chile 13 June 2005 35% Yes Yes No 
Australia 27 October 2004 16.6% Yes Yes Yes (as of 
2012) 
New Zealand 27 January 2004 19.9% Yes Yes - 
cigarettes 
Under 
review 
(2012) 
Malaysia 16 September 2005 26% Yes Yes - 
cigarettes 
No 
Singapore 14 May 2004 21% Yes Yes No 
Vietnam 17 December 2004 23.8% Yes No No 
Brunei Darruslam 3 June 2004 18 % Yes Yes - 
cigarettes 
No 
Japan 8 June 2004 27% Yes No No 
Thailand 
(possible member) 
8 November 2004 24% Yes Yes - 
cigarettes 
No 
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The Philippines 
(possible member) 
6 June 2005 28% Yes No No 
Data compiled from World Health Organization country profiles: see World Health Organization, Tobacco 
Control Country Profiles <http://www.who.int/tobacco/surveillance/policy/country_profile/en/index.html>. 
 
 There has been debate as to whether the TPP has undermined democratic decision-
making processes by elected representatives – particularly in respect of public health.14 There 
has been much concern about the lack of transparency, due process, and public participation in 
the TPP.15 Lori Wallach of Public Citizen has described the proposed agreement as ‘NAFTA 
on Steroids’, saying: ‘Think of the TPP as a stealthy delivery mechanism for policies that could 
not survive public scrutiny.’16 A number of those with inside access to the TPP have an interest 
in tobacco and tobacco control – including Roger Quarles of the Burley Tobacco Growers 
Cooperative Association Inc, Clyde N. Wayne Jr. of Tobacco Associates Inc, and Monique 
Muggli of the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids.17 Although trade officials and members of 
trade committees have had access to the texts, the texts have not been made available to 
politicians, civil society, or the wider public. Wallach has argued that civil activists should 
                                                          
14  Inside Story Americas, ‘Will the Pacific Trade Deal Protect Workers?’, Al-Jazeera, 5 December 2012 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestoryamericas/2012/12/2012125101118819500.html>. 
15  Carolina Rossini, ‘Congress Members Demand USTR Tell the American People What’s Going on with 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership and its Impact on Digital Freedom’ on Deeplinks Blog (5 September 2012) 
<https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/09/congress-demand-ustr-reveal-tpp>. 
16  Lori Wallach, ‘NAFTA on Steroids’, The Nation (New York), 16 July 2012 
<http://www.thenation.com/article/168627/nafta-steroids>.  
17  Agricultural Technical Advisory Committee for Trade, Office of the United States Trade Representative 
<http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/intergovernmental-affairs/advisory-committees/agricultural-technical-advisory-
committee-tra>. 
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pursue a ‘Dracula’ strategy to bring the TPP out of the twilight and into the sunshine of public 
debate.18  
The Kentucky delegation in the United States Congress has lobbied the United States 
Trade Representative on behalf of tobacco companies.19 In October 2011, a number of United 
States Congressmen and women from Kentucky – led by Representative Geoff Davis and 
Senator Mitch McConnell – wrote to Ambassador Kirk, expressing their ‘strong opposition to 
requests to exclude products, specifically tobacco, from the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement negotiations’.20 The submission emphasised: ‘Excluding specific products from the 
TPPA could have a serious impact on future trade agreement negotiations and significantly 
damage Kentucky’s economy.’21 The Kentucky delegation made a crude slippery slope 
argument that the exclusion of tobacco would lead to the exclusion of other products, such as 
alcohol and dairy products: ‘Excluding tobacco from the TPP would establish a broad and 
possibly economically debilitating precedent potentially applicable to any industry.’22 The 
                                                          
18  Lori Wallach, ‘Can a “Dracula” Strategy Bring Out the Trans-Pacific Partnership into the Sunlight’ on 
Truthout (30 November 2012) <http://truth-out.org/news/item/13061-can-a-dracula-strategy-bring-trans-pacific-
partnership-into-the-sunlight>. 
19  See, for instance: Tobacco’s Status in the Trade Transaction is Disputed (14 March 2012) Tobacco Facts 
<http://www.tobacco-facts.net/2012/03/tobaccos-status-in-the-trade-transaction-is-disputed>; Paul Hornback and 
Wilson Stone, ‘Plan to Exclude Tobacco from Trade Pact Unfair to State of Kentucky: Farm Families Deserve 
Level Playing Field’, Kentucky.com, 2 April 2012 <http://www.kentucky.com/2012/04/02/2135891/plan-to-
exclude-tobacco-from-trade.html>. 
20  Letter from Representatives Geoff Davis, Harold Rogers, Ed Whitfield, Ben Chandler, John Yarnruth 
and Ben Guthrie and Senators Mitch McConnell and Rand Paul to the United States Trade Representative (7 
October 2011) <http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/sfr_tpp_david.pdf>. 
21  Ibid. 
22  Ibid. 
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Kentucky politicians maintained that there was a need to include tobacco trade in the TPP in 
order to protect American jobs:  
 
As over eighty percent of tobacco grown in Kentucky is exported to other countries, the exclusion of 
tobacco products from the TPPA threatens our growers’ business and could have the communities where 
they live and employ Kentuckians.23 
 
Similarly, Congressman Sanford Bishop from Georgia – along with other representatives and 
senators for Georgia – wrote a letter to Ambassador Kirk, urging him to ‘ensure that Georgia’s 
tobacco farmers are not excluded from taking advantage of trade protections offered under the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement’.24 
In May 2012, Congresswoman Renee Ellmers, a Republican from North Carolina, also 
published in support of trade in tobacco under the TPP.25 She maintained that the tobacco 
industry had been the victim of unfair prejudice: ‘Tobacco farmers deserve the same 
recognition and consideration as any other legal agricultural commodity.’26 Congressman Mike 
McIntyre, also from North Carolina, argued: ‘Including a safe harbor provision in the trade 
                                                          
23  Ibid. 
24  Congressman Sanford D. Bishop, Jr, ‘Bishop Seeks Trade Protections for Georgia’s Tobacco Farmers’ 
(Press Release, 2 December 2011) <http://bishop.house.gov/press-release/bishop-seeks-trade-protections-
georgias-tobacco-farmers>. 
25  Tom Doheny, Ellmers Calls for Responsible Treatment of Tobacco Farmers in Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (15 May 2012) Congresswoman Renee Ellmers <http://ellmers.house.gov/latest-news/ellmers-calls-
for-responsible-treatment-of-tobacco-farmers-in-transpacific-partnership/>. 
26  Ibid. 
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deal will treat tobacco unfairly, and the Administration needs to hear from the farming and 
business community that opposes this effort.’27 
In the context of this heavy lobbying by Big Tobacco and its proxies, this chapter 
provides an analysis of the debate over trade, tobacco, and the TPP. This discussion is 
necessarily focused on the negotiations of the free trade agreement – the shadowy conflicts 
before the finalisation of the text. This chapter contends that the trade negotiations threaten 
hard-won gains in public health – including international developments such as the WHO 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, and domestic measures, such as graphic health 
warnings and the plain packaging of tobacco products. It maintains that there is a need for 
regional trade agreements to respect the primacy of the WHO Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control. There is a need both to provide for an open and transparent process regarding 
such trade negotiations, as well as a due and proper respect for public health in terms of 
substantive obligations. Part I focuses on the debate over the intellectual property chapter of 
the TPP, within the broader context of domestic litigation against Australia’s plain tobacco 
packaging regime and associated WTO disputes. Part II examines the investment chapter of 
the TPP, taking account of ongoing investment disputes concerning tobacco control and the 
declared approaches of Australia and New Zealand to investor–state dispute settlement. Part 
III looks at the discussion as to whether there should be specific text on tobacco control in the 
TPP, and, if so, what should be its nature and content. This chapter concludes that the plain 
                                                          
27  Congressman Mike McIntyre, ‘USTR Heeds McIntyre’s Call, Holds off Introduction of Tobacco Text 
in TPP to gather input from tobacco community’ (Press Release, 15 May 2012) 
<http://mcintyre.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=627:-ustr-heeds-mcintyres-call-
holds-off-introduction-of-tobacco-text-in-tpp-to-gather-input-from-tobacco-community&catid=1:2010-press-
releases&Itemid=26>.  
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packaging of tobacco products – and other best practices in tobacco control – should be adopted 
by members of the Pacific Rim. 
 
I. Intellectual Property 
 
In a number of contexts, the tobacco companies and their confederates have argued that the 
plain packaging of tobacco products amounts to a violation of their intellectual property 
rights.28 Such arguments have been framed in terms of constitutional law, trade law, and 
investment law. The United States Chamber of Commerce’s statements about the plain 
packaging of tobacco products are typical in this regard: 
 
We believe that the lack of distinguishing trade dress and labelling may ultimately result in an increased 
risk of consumer deception and confusion; may paradoxically result in unintended harm to public health; 
and would deny the property rights of companies and their workers who have invested in building their 
brand’s reputation.29 
 
This position represents an extremely aggressive form of intellectual property maximalism, 
which presumes that intellectual property rights can block government health regulation. Such 
a stance fails to recognise that intellectual property law is intended to serve larger public 
objectives – including the protection of public health. 
 
A The High Court of Australia 
                                                          
28  Freeman, Chapman and Rimmer, above n 2. 
29  United States Chamber of Commerce, Submission to the Department of Health and Ageing, Public 
Consultation on the Exposure Draft of the Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill 2011, 26 May 2011 
<http://www.health.gov.au/internet/yourhealth/publishing.nsf/Content/Myron-Brilliant>. 
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Professor Tania Voon has observed: ‘Plain packaging of cigarettes and other tobacco products 
represents a crucial focal point for industry, government, and public health across the world 
today.’30 
In order to support the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the 
Australian parliament passed the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth), with the support of 
all the main political parties. In response, Japan Tobacco International31 and British American 
Tobacco32 brought legal action in the High Court of Australia, complaining that the Tobacco 
Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) amounted to an acquisition of property on less than just terms 
under s 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution 1901. Philip Morris Ltd and Imperial Tobacco 
intervened in the case, supporting their fellow tobacco companies. The Australian Government 
defended the constitutionality of the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth).33 The 
Australian Government was supported by the Cancer Council Australia and the governments 
of the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory, and Queensland. 
Having announced its ruling in August 2012, the High Court of Australia published the 
reasons for its decision on the tobacco companies’ challenge to Australia’s regime for the plain 
                                                          
30  Tania Voon, ‘Introduction’ in Tania Voon et al. (eds), Public Health and Plain Packaging of Cigarettes: 
Legal Issues (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012) 1, 1. 
31 Case S409/2011: JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia, High Court of Australia 
<http://www.hcourt.gov.au/cases/case-s409/2011>. 
32 Case S389/2411: British American Tobacco Australasia Limited and Ors v The Commonwealth of 
Australia, High Court of Australia <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/cases/case-s389/2011>. 
33  Matthew Rimmer, ‘Big Tobacco’s Box Fetish: Plain Packaging at the High Court’, The Conversation 
(20 April 2012) <http://theconversation.edu.au/big-tobaccos-box-fetish-plain-packaging-at-the-high-court-
6518>.  
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packaging of tobacco products in October 2012.34 By a majority of six to one, the High Court 
of Australia rejected the arguments of the tobacco companies that there had been an acquisition 
of property under the Australian Constitution 1901. After listening to extensive arguments, the 
court closely considered the public health objectives of the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 
(Cth) and related regulations. Hayne and Bell JJ observed: ‘Legislation that requires warning 
labels to be placed on products, even warning labels as extensive as those required by the Plain 
Packaging Act, effect no acquisition of property.’35 The judges ruled that ‘The Plain Packaging 
Act is not a law by which the Commonwealth acquires any interest in property, however slight 
or insubstantial it may be.’36 The judges concluded: ‘The Plain Packaging Act is not a law with 
respect to the acquisition of property.’37  
Kiefel J emphasised: ‘Many kinds of products have been subjected to regulation in 
order to prevent or reduce the likelihood of harm.’38 Her Honour noted that labelling is required 
for medicines, poisonous substances as well as some food ‘to both protect and promote public 
health’.39 Discussing the history of tobacco regulation in Australia, she summarised the 
cumulative impact of public health measures and suggested plain packaging was but the latest 
of a long line of tobacco control measures in Australia.  
                                                          
34  JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia (2012) 291 ALR 669 (‘JT International’). This 
discussion draws upon my piece: Matthew Rimmer, ‘The High Court and the Marlboro Man: The Plain Packaging 
Decision’, The Conversation (18 October 2012) <http://theconversation.edu.au/the-high-court-and-the-marlboro-
man-the-plain-packaging-decision-10014>. 
35  JT International (2012) 291 ALR 669, 713. 
36  Ibid., 714. 
37  Ibid. 
38  Ibid., 746. 
39  Ibid. 
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Noting the links between smoking tobacco and fatal diseases, Crennan J observed that 
the regime implemented international health law: ‘The objects of the Packaging Act are to 
improve public health and to give effect to certain obligations that Australia has as a party to 
the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.’40 She insisted: ‘Legislative provisions 
requiring manufacturers or retailers to place on product packaging warnings to consumers of 
the dangers of incorrectly using or positively misusing a product are commonplace.’41 
French CJ emphasised the public policy dimensions of intellectual property law, noting 
that trade mark legislation has ‘manifested from time to time a varying accommodation of 
commercial and the consuming public’s interests’.42 
Gummow J commented that ‘trade mark legislation, in general, does not confer a 
“statutory monopoly” in any crude sense’.43 The judge emphasised that the Trade Marks Act 
1995 (Cth) did not confer ‘a liberty to use registered trade marks free from restraints found in 
other statutes’.44 
In his dissent, Heydon J complained generally about the government encroaching upon 
the acquisition of property clause.45 
The decision of the High Court of Australia will encourage other countries to join an 
‘Olive Revolution’, introducing plain packaging of tobacco products.46 New Zealand, 
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41  Ibid., 729. 
42  Ibid., 679, quoting Campomar Sociedad, Limitada v Nike International Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 45, 65. 
43  Ibid. 
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46  Matthew Rimmer, ‘The Olive Revolution: Australia’s Plain Packaging Leads the World’, The 
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Scotland, India, Uruguay, and Norway are particularly keen to follow Australia’s lead.47 Under 
the leadership of David Cameron’s Conservative Party, England and Wales have equivocated 
upon whether they will adopt the plain packaging of tobacco products.48 
 
B The WTO 
 
Australia’s Minister for Trade in 2012, Craig Emerson, stressed that the victory in the High 
Court of Australia will strengthen Australia’s defence of the plain packaging of tobacco 
                                                          
47  On New Zealand, see New Zealand Ministry of Health, Proposal to Introduce Plain Packaging of 
Tobacco Products in New Zealand: Consultation Document (23 July 2012) 
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<http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/156105/>. On Scotland, see Ministers Aim to Make Scotland “Tobacco 
Free” by 2034 (27 March 2013) BBC News <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-
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48  On England and Wales, see Standardised Packaging of Tobacco Products (2012) The United Kingdom 
Department of Health <http://consultations.dh.gov.uk/tobacco/standardised-packaging-of-tobacco-
products/consult_view>; Patrick Wintour, ‘Government to Legislate for Plain Cigarette Packaging this Year’, The 
Guardian, 5 March 2013 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2013/mar/05/government-legislate-plain-cigarette-
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condemned-for-bowing-to-tobacco-industry-over-plain-packs/>; Tanya Gold, ‘Death is Tobacco Companies’ 
Business’, The Guardian, 5 May 2013 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/may/05/death-tobacco-
companies-business-packaging>. 
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products in international fora.49 He emphasised that the Australian Government would 
vigorously defend challenges against the regime brought by Ukraine, Honduras, the Dominican 
Republic through the World Trade Organization.50 Emerson maintained: ‘Australia will 
strongly defend its right to regulate to protect public health through the plain packaging of 
tobacco products.’51 Both TRIPS and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade have long 
recognised that WTO Members can take measures necessary to protect public health. Emerson 
has also stressed that Australia will defend plain packaging in other arenas: ‘Australia will 
strongly defend its plain packaging legislation in all forums.’52 Cuba and Indonesia have 
announced in 2013 that it will join the challenges to Australia’s plain packaging regime in the 
World Trade Organization.53 
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53  David Jolly, ‘Cuba Challenges Australian Tobacco Rules’. The New York Times, 6 May 2013 
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C The TPP 
 
There has also been concern that Big Tobacco is trying to use the TPP as a Trojan horse to 
attack tobacco control measures.54 In a revealing submission to the United States Trade 
Representative, Philip Morris expressed concern about ‘government-sponsored initiatives that 
would effectively cancel or expropriate valuable trademark rights’.55 The company supported 
‘the inclusion of a comprehensive “TRIPs-plus” intellectual property chapter that includes a 
high standard of protection for trademarks and patents’.56 In particular, Philip Morris objected 
to Australia’s regime of plain packaging of tobacco products: ‘The consequences of the 
introduction of plain packaging in Australia are far-reaching and should be examined in the 
broader context of U.S.–Australia trade relations and in the upcoming TPP negotiations.’57 The 
company also made objections to Singapore’s Smoking (Control of Advertisements & Sale of 
Tobacco) Act.58 
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There has been concern about the intellectual property chapter of the TPP.59 There was 
a leak of the draft text of the intellectual property Chapter of the TPP in 2011.60 The United 
States has promoted an ambitious intellectual property chapter with standards above and 
beyond those in TRIPS, the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement,61 and even 
ACTA.62 The chapter will cover copyright law, trade mark law, patent law, customs and border 
measures, and intellectual property enforcement. There have been particular concerns about 
tight parallel importation restrictions, the evergreening of drug patents, and draconian penalties 
for piracy and counterfeiting. 
Sean Flynn and his colleagues provided a comprehensive analysis of the text, 
observing:63 
 
The U.S. proposals, if adopted, would create the highest intellectual property protection and enforcement 
standards in any free trade agreement to date. If adopted, the TPP would predictably lead to higher prices 
and decreased access to a broad range of consumer products in many TPP member countries, from 
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Conversation (15 June 2012) <http://theconversation.edu.au/a-mercurial-treaty-the-trans-pacific-partnership-
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60  ‘The Complete Feb 10, 2011 Text of the US Proposal for the TPP IPR Chapter’ on Knowledge Ecology 
International (10 March 2011) <http://keionline.org/node/1091>. 
61  Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement, signed 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1 (entered into force 
1 January 2005).  
62  Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, signed 1 October 2011, [2011] ATNIF 22 (not yet in force).  
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medicines to textbooks to information on the internet, with little or no benefit to any TPP member in the 
form of increased innovation, creativity or local economic activity.64 
 
The leaked version of the intellectual property chapter lacks appropriate safeguards with 
respect to public health – particularly with regard to tobacco control measures contemplated 
under the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.  
Inside US Trade has reported that Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore have 
proposed replacing some elements of the United States proposal on intellectual property 
enforcement with language drawn from ACTA.65 This is also disturbing. The European 
Parliament and its various committees overwhelmingly rejected ACTA.66 The United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Anand Grover, applauded this decision: ‘ACTA’s 
defeat in Europe is a welcome blow to the flawed agreement that has failed to address numerous 
concerns related to access to medicines.’67 
In June 2012, the Australian Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Treaties 
recommended delaying and postponing ratification of ACTA.68 The Committee recommended:  
that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement not be ratified by Australia until the:  
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• Joint Standing Committee on Treaties has received and considered the independent and 
transparent assessment of the economic and social benefits and costs of the Agreement referred 
to in Recommendation 2;  
• Australian Law Reform Commission has reported on its Inquiry into Copyright and the Digital 
Economy; and  
• the Australian Government has issued notices of clarification in relation to the terms of the 
Agreement as recommended in the other recommendations of this report.69 
 
There were concerns about the impact of the treaty upon Australia’s health-care system – 
particularly in respect of tobacco control and access to essential medicines.70 It is notable that 
ACTA did not provide proper recognition for the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control. 
Comparing ACTA and the TPP, Professor Peter Yu has written about the ‘alphabet 
soup of transborder intellectual property enforcement’.71 He contended that the United States 
has greater political and economic leverage in the TPP: ‘Without the European Union at the 
negotiation table, the United States is able to rely more on its sheer economic and geopolitical 
strengths to push for provisions that are in the interest of its intellectual property industries.’72 
Yu worries: ‘Because of the different value negotiating parties place on trade and trade-related 
items, some parties may be willing to concede more on intellectual property protection and 
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enforcement in exchange for greater benefits in other trade or trade-related areas.’73 He fears 
that the ‘TPP, therefore, could include more stringent obligations in the intellectual property 
area’.74 
There is a need for the TPP to instead support a development agenda – which allows 
for countries to take measures to address public health concerns, such as tobacco control. 
II Investment 
 
There has been controversy over Big Tobacco using investor–state dispute resolution 
mechanisms to challenge public health measures – such as graphic warnings and the plain 
packaging of tobacco products.  
 
A. Ongoing Investment Challenges 
 
After moving the shares of its Australian subsidiary to Hong Kong, Philip Morris has brought 
a contrived investor–state arbitration claim under the Australia–Hong Kong Agreement on the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments.75 The economist, Peter Martin, notes:  
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The almost comic attempt to get mileage out of the treaty (moving from Australia to Hong Kong in order 
to complain that it was being discriminated against because it was from Hong Kong) masks a broader, 
more serious attempt to turn trade treaties into instruments that allow corporations to sue governments.76  
 
There has been much academic criticism of the investment action by Philip Morris.77 
Philip Morris has also used international investment rules to challenge Uruguay’s 
restrictions on cigarette marketing.78 In particular, the tobacco company has complained about 
graphic health warnings being used by the Uruguayan Government, lamenting that: ‘The 80 
per cent health warning coverage requirement unfairly limits Abal’s right to use its legally 
protected trademarks, and not to promote legitimate health policies.’79 Benn McGrady provides 
a thoughtful analysis of the ramifications of the dispute.80 
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In the context of the TPP discussions, there has been concern that tobacco companies 
would use investment clauses to challenge public health measures – such as tobacco control. 
 
B Australian Policy 
 
In a trade policy, the Australian Labor Party Government has disavowed the inclusion of 
investor–state dispute resolution clauses in any future free trade agreements – including the 
TPP.81 The statement notes: 
 
Some countries have sought to insert investor-state dispute resolution clauses into trade agreements. 
Typically these clauses empower businesses from one country to take international legal action against 
the government of another country for alleged breaches of the agreement, such as for policies that 
allegedly discriminate against those businesses and in favour of the country’s domestic businesses.82 
 
The policy document states: ‘The Government does not support provisions that would confer 
greater legal rights on foreign businesses than those available to domestic businesses.’83 The 
trade statement emphasises that: ‘The Government has not and will not accept provisions that 
limit its capacity to put health warnings or plain packaging requirements on tobacco products 
or its ability to continue the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme.’84 Moreover, the policy 
document observes: ‘If Australian businesses are concerned about sovereign risk in Australian 
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trading partner countries, they will need to make their own assessments about whether they 
want to commit to investing in those countries.’85 
A number of industry groups and trade lawyers have been irked by the policy of the 
Australian Government to refuse to sign trade agreements with state–investor dispute 
resolution clauses. The Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry has lobbied for the 
inclusion of investment clauses in free trade agreements – including the TPP. The law firm 
Clifford Chance has argued: ‘It is Australian companies investing offshore that will perhaps 
suffer most from the Australian government’s new approach.’86 Trade lawyer Leon Trakman 
has protested: ‘Australian investors abroad probably will suffer.’87 Arbitrator Michael Pryles 
has observed that: ‘We have the recent example of tobacco companies saying their trademarks 
have been expropriated, but it’s unusual.’88 
The Conservative Coalition won the Australian election in September 2013. The 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Julie Bishop, has written that she will reconsider including 
investment clauses in the TPP.89 The Minister for Trade and Investment, Andrew Robb, had 
emphasized that the Coalition is open to utilising investor-state dispute settlement clauses as 
part of Australia’s negotiating position. 
                                                          
85  Ibid. 
86  Chris Merritt, ‘Change in Treaty Policy Detrimental to Aussie Companies: Clifford Chance’, The 
Australian (Australia), 7 September 2012. 
87  Ibid. 
88  Ibid. 
89 Julie Bishop, ‘Free Trade Focus’, Online Opinion (28 March 2013) 
<http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=14855>. For a critique, see Greens Senator Peter Whish-
Wilson, ‘Past is not the Future for Trade’, Online Opinion (8 April 2013) 
<http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=14879>. 
32 
 
Such advocacy for investment clauses is weak and unconvincing. The abuse of 
investment clauses by tobacco companies is not unusual or exceptional. It is commonplace. 
The involvement of Philip Morris in the TPP highlights this problem. 
 
C The TPP 
 
A key chapter of the TPP relates to investment. Philip Morris has been a strong supporter of 
the inclusion of an investor–state dispute resolution mechanism in the TPP: 
 
Philip Morris International has made significant investments in many countries, including the identified 
U.S. TPP partners. For that reason, we believe strong investor protections must be a critical element of 
the TPP and any future U.S. Free Trade Agreements.  
 PMI supports the inclusion in the TPP of an investor–state dispute settlement mechanism. The 
strong investment chapter of the yet-to-be ratified U.S.–South Korea Free Trade Agreement should be 
used as a model for negotiating a similar chapter in the TPP.  
 PMI considers the availability of an investor–state dispute settlement mechanism, including the 
right for investors to submit disputes to independent international tribunals, a vital aspect of protecting 
its foreign investments.90 
 
Under such a mechanism, Philip Morris would be able to challenge government regulations – 
much like they have done in disputes with Australia and Uruguay. 
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There has been much concern about the investment chapter of the TPP – especially 
since a draft of the text has been leaked in 2012.91 The regime provides that no party may 
expropriate or nationalise a covered investment except for a public purpose, and with prompt, 
adequate, and effective compensation. The chapter also establishes an investor–state dispute 
settlement system: one that enables corporations from one country to take legal action against 
the government of another country for alleged breaches of the agreement. Professor Thomas 
Faunce of the Australian National University has observed of this text: ‘Such proposals give 
foreign investors (such as tobacco multinationals) greater rights than domestic investors.’92 
There are only vague safeguards in respect of public health – such as ‘the parties recognise that 
it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing its health, safety or environmental 
measures’.93 There is no specific, explicit recognition in this draft regime for the WHO 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. 
With the leak of the investment chapter, the Obama Administration stands accused of 
breaking its 2008 campaign promise:  
 
We will not negotiate bilateral trade agreements that stop the government from protecting the 
environment, food safety, or the health of its citizens; give greater rights to foreign investors than to U.S. 
investors; require the privatization of our vital public services; or prevent developing country 
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governments from adopting humanitarian licensing policies to improve access to life-saving 
medications.94 
 
D New Zealand 
 
Taking a principled stance, the Australian Government has thus far refused to submit to the 
investor–state dispute resolution clause. However, the New Zealand Prime Minister John Key 
has argued that there should not be special treatment for Australia: ‘An exclusion solely for 
Australia, not for everybody else, is unlikely to be something that we would support.’95 His 
position is misguided. Professor Jane Kelsey from the University of Auckland has commented: 
‘The global multi-billion-dollar commercial players that dominate the alcohol and tobacco 
industries can afford to fund lengthy and costly arbitration to stop precedent-setting policies, 
even where their legal case is weak.’96 She has written a report on international trade law and 
tobacco control.97 She has commented:  
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The proposed TPPA poses the most serious imminent risk to New Zealand’s ability to design, introduce 
and implement the innovative tobacco control policies needed to achieve the 2025 goal, as it would 
legally guarantee the tobacco industry and supply chain stronger, enforceable legal rights and the 
opportunity to influence domestic policy.98 
 
The New Zealand Prime Minister John Key has struggled with questions on investment and 
the TPP in the New Zealand Parliament.99 The New Zealand Greens co-leader, Metiria Turei, 
asked John Key: ‘Will New Zealand open itself up to litigation from firms based in the Trans-
Pacific Partnership countries should we sign up to the investor–State dispute settlement 
procedures, which Australia has rejected?’100 In response, John Key mischaracterised the 
approach of the Australian Government to the question of investment: 
 
Well for a start-off, I do not think it is actually correct to say that Australia has rejected them. What is 
true to say is that there are different countries bringing different perspectives to the negotiation, but when 
a final Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement is agreed, all parties are likely to sign up.101 
 
Under further questioning, Prime Minister Key was unfamiliar with a number of investment 
disputes – such as the action against Germany’s environmental controls on coal-fired power 
stations;102 the action by the Renco Group against Peru in respect of regulations designed to 
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stop lead poisoning;103 and the action by Chevron Oil under investor–state procedures against 
Ecuador in respect of clean-costs for toxic waste.104 Prime Minister Key insists more generally 
upon the existence of ‘safeguards’ in the TPP: ‘I can tell you the way that New Zealand 
legislates and goes about these free-trade agreements, and it is very careful to give itself the 
safeguards that we would think make sense.’105 However, the leaked text from the draft 
investment chapter would suggest that such ‘safeguards’ are not particularly safe. 
The New Zealand Prime Minister John Key was particularly non-plussed by questions 
over tobacco control and the TPP. The New Zealand Greens co-leader, Metiria Turei, asked 
John Key:  
 
Does the Prime Minister have any concerns that Philip Morris could use the investor-State procedures in 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership to sue New Zealand, given its actions in Australia and the veiled threats 
made by its spokesperson in New Zealand, Chris Bishop; if not, why not?106 
  
In response, John Key argued: 
 
The member will be aware that Australia as of 1 December went into its programme of plain packaging. 
It is not in any way concerned about doing that and continuing to be part of the officials group and 
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continuing to negotiate as part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. That tells you that it must believe that 
the two policies are compatible.107 
 
Again, the New Zealand Prime Minister is incorrect on this point. The Australian Government 
has indeed expressed concerns about interference by Big Tobacco in the TPP negotiations. 
Similarly, United States Members of Congress – like Henry Waxman – have also been 
concerned by the approach of the United States Trade Representative to the question of tobacco 
control and the TPP. 
In 2013, the New Zealand Government announced that it would adopt the plain 
packaging of tobacco products in 2013 – while still pursuing the TPP. 
 
III. Tobacco Control 
 
The United States Trade Representative, Ambassador Ron Kirk, has been equivocal on the 
question of tobacco control and the TPP.108 In February 2012, the Ambassador appeared before 
the United States Congress, and said: ‘We have not tabled any proposal to exclude any 
product.’109 Kirk has said: ‘There are people who are fanatically opinionated on both sides.’110 
He observed: ‘Our job is to follow U.S. law. Strike that balance. But on this one we’ll sometime 
have to make a decision.’111 There has been a concern that the United States Trade 
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Representative has been willing to appease or placate the representatives of the tobacco 
industry. There has also been discussion of the United States Trade Representative having ties 
with the tobacco industry – having been a partner of Vinson & Elkins LLP which defended the 
tobacco industry, and a consultant to the tobacco company, Philip Morris.112  
 
A The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 
 
In the TPP negotiations, the United States Trade Representative’s objective is to create a ‘safe 
harbour’ for the United States Food and Drug Administration to regulate tobacco products 
under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009. There is a need to 
understand the nature of the Obama Administration’s tobacco control measures. 
On 22 June 2009, President Barack Obama signed into law the Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009. The President reflected upon the significance of 
the legislative reform: ‘Since at least the middle of the last century, we’ve known about the 
harmful and often deadly effects of tobacco products.’ 113 He lamented: ‘More than 400,000 
Americans now die of tobacco-related illnesses each year, making it the leading cause of 
preventable death in the United States.’ 114 President Obama observed: ‘This legislation will not 
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ban all tobacco products, and it will allow adults to make their own choices.’115 He noted that 
this legislation ‘will force these companies to more clearly and publicly acknowledge the 
harmful and deadly effects of the products they sell’.116 
The tobacco industry has brought a range of lawsuits against the Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009.117 President Obama reflected upon such 
litigation: 
Today, some big tobacco companies are trying to block these labels because they don’t want to be 
honest about the consequences of using their products. Unfortunately, this isn’t surprising. We’ve 
always known that the fight to stop smoking in this country won’t be easy.118 
 
There have been variations between how circuit courts in the United States have addressed the 
challenges by the tobacco industry to graphic health warnings – most notably between 
Kentucky,119 which dismissed a challenge to graphic health warnings, and the District of 
Columbia, where the tobacco industry’s challenge was upheld.120 
In December 2012, the United States Court of Appeals denied the request by the United 
States Government for the full court or panel to rehear the case in the District Court of 
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Columbia.121 The United States Government considered appealing the decision to the Supreme 
Court of the United States.122 In the end, the Department of Justice sent a letter to the House 
speaker, saying that it would not ask the Supreme Court of the United States to review the 
ruling.123  
However, the tobacco industry’s challenges to the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act of 2009 have not necessarily been successful, either. In April 2013, the 
Supreme Court of the United States refused to hear a challenge to the regime by tobacco 
companies such as R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.124 
Such domestic conflict may help explain the focus of the United States Trade 
Representative’s proposal on tobacco control.125 Such litigation demonstrates that the tobacco 
industry has increasingly tried to co-opt and appropriate the language of freedom of speech in 
legal debates. Professor Kevin Outterson has warned that ‘powerful corporations are 
increasingly using an expanding definition of the First Amendment to challenge public health 
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regulations’.126 He has observed that: ‘For public health advocates, one lesson is that the 
purpose and mechanism for new regulations must be carefully articulated and documented, 
especially if any conceivable First Amendment issue can be raised.’127  
 
B The United States Trade Representative’s Proposal on Tobacco Control 
 
In 2012, the United States Trade Representative has published a statement on its proposal on 
tobacco control on its website.128 The statement notes that the Obama Administration sought 
input from ‘health advocates, farmers, industry stakeholders, and others’ on tobacco and the 
TPP.129 The United States Trade Representative observed that: ‘The [Obama] Administration 
also considered the increasing effort both in the United States and around the world over the 
past several years to regulate tobacco products.’130 Particular reference is made to the Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 (US). 
While not making the draft proposal publicly available, the United States Trade 
Representative has published a limited summary, emphasising that the draft proposal has three 
elements. First, the proposal ‘would explicitly recognize the unique status of tobacco products 
from a health and regulatory perspective’.131 Second, ‘the proposal would make tobacco 
products (like other products) subject to tariff phase-outs, thus avoiding putting U.S. tobacco 
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products at a competitive disadvantage and avoiding a precedent for excluding tobacco or other 
products from future U.S. tariff negotiations’.132 Third, the proposal would ‘include language 
in the “general exceptions” chapter that allows health authorities in TPP governments to adopt 
regulations that impose origin-neutral, science-based restrictions on specific tobacco 
products/classes in order to safeguard public health’.133 
Focusing upon the United States, the United States Trade Representative commented: 
  
This language will create a safe harbor for FDA tobacco regulation, providing greater certainty that the 
provisions in the TPP will not be used in a manner that would prevent FDA from taking the sorts of 
incremental regulatory actions that are necessary to effectively implement the Tobacco Control Act, 
while retaining important trade disciplines (national treatment, compensation for expropriations, and 
transparency) on tobacco measures.134 
 
A number of former United States Trade Representatives have written to the current United 
States Trade Representative, Ambassador Ron Kirk, urging him not to propose a tobacco-
specific exception.135 The authors portrayed the provisions creating policy space as open to 
abuse by recalcitrant trading partners. The authors stated:  
 
While we are confident that the United States would not adopt or impose measures that restrict trade or 
investment without a sound basis to do so, we have witnessed over the years other governments 
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attempting to justify their protectionist measures in the name of health or safety, especially in 
agriculture.136 
 
At the Auckland talks in November 2012,137 the United States Trade Representative refused to 
table the proposal on tobacco control, because the agency was still apparently reviewing input 
from stakeholders. A spokeswoman for the office said: ‘We are still reflecting on what we’ve 
heard from stakeholders on our TPP tobacco proposal, and will be continuing consultations 
beyond the December 3–12 Auckland round to determine the right balance on this issue.’138 
Matthew Myers, president of the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, has been displeased by this 
prevarication: ‘USTR consulted fully before it crafted its proposal. There is nothing that will 
satisfy the tobacco companies.’139 His concern was that the United States Trade Representative 
was retreating from its proposal to protect tobacco control measures. 
This proposal seems rather parochial, modelled upon United States domestic law and 
political exigencies. Benn McGrady comments: ‘It seems worth adding that the proposal 
appears more responsive to the outcome of US–Clove Cigarettes and preserving the regulatory 
powers of the FDA than to contemporary developments, such as ongoing claims against 
Australia and Uruguay.’140 
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By 2013, the USTR had retreated from its proposal for a safe harbour in respect of 
tobacco control, to the dismay of public health advocates. 
 
C United States Congressman Henry Waxman’s Critique 
 
Senior United States Congressman Henry Waxman has raised significant reservations about 
the proposed text on tobacco control.141 He commented:  
 
In light of recent trade challenges to U.S. and Australian tobacco control laws, I am concerned that the 
exemption contemplated in the U.S. proposal emphasizes regulatory measures and fails to also explicitly 
exempt statutory tobacco control measures that otherwise meet the origin-neutral and science-based 
criteria set forth in the Proposal.142  
 
Congressman Waxman stressed that in his view: ‘it is essential to safeguard countries’ 
sovereign authority to take the most appropriate and most feasible action to protect the health 
of their citizens.’143 Waxman was also ‘deeply troubled that the U.S. Proposal fails to exclude 
tobacco products from tariff schedule reductions’.144 He observed: ‘This element of the 
Proposal is contrary to the intent and the spirit of the “Doggett Amendment” and Executive 
Order 13193 issued by President Clinton, both of which prohibit the U.S. government from 
promoting the sale or export of tobacco products.’145 Congressman Waxman emphasised the 
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need for the United States Trade Representative to respect local laws: ‘In the case of the United 
States, this would safeguard the implementation of the Tobacco Control Act, legislation that is 
critically important in addressing our country’s ongoing problem with tobacco addiction.’146 
 
D Further Criticism of the Tobacco Control Text 
 
In a letter to Ambassador Ron Kirk, United States health groups observed: ‘There is a global 
consensus that governments should be doing everything possible to reduce consumption of 
tobacco products and the resulting harms from that consumption.’147 The organisations 
maintain that ‘Trade agreements should not undermine the authority of governments to [reduce 
tobacco use].’148 The groups note that ‘This consensus is reflected in the world’s first public 
health treaty, the World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 
under which 175 countries have made legally binding commitments to enact effective tobacco 
control measures.’149 The health groups comment that ‘the global goal of reducing tobacco 
usage is in contrast to the usual free trade goal of expanding access to and consumption of 
products.’150 The submission emphasised: ‘Tobacco products killed 100 million people in the 
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20th century and will kill one billion people in the 21st century unless governments take urgent 
action.’151 
Chris Bostic, deputy director for policy at the Action on Smoking and Health, has 
commented that the United States regime is parochial, and very focused upon domestic United 
States law.152 He has noted that officials from the United States Trade Representative 
‘recognize the weaknesses … in that it won’t apply to a lot of the ways that other countries do 
tobacco control regulations’.153 
Dr Margaret Chan of the World Health Organization has warned: ‘The incentive for 
industry to use international trade or investment agreements in lobbying or litigation is 
especially high when potentially trend-setting measures are at stake.’154 She stressed: ‘This is 
true for very large health warnings on packs in Uruguay, legislation mandating plain packaging 
in Australia, and a ban on point-of-sales advertising in Norway.’155 
There is a failure to acknowledge or recognise the primacy of international law on 
tobacco control. Conspicuously, the summary of the proposed text on the TPP fails to mention 
the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, and its accompanying guidelines. This 
omission is regrettable and lamentable. There is a need to ensure that the TPP does not affect 
the comprehensive range of tobacco control measures contemplated by the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control – such as the plain packaging of tobacco products. 
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Furthermore, there is also a need to ensure that any future tobacco control initiatives under the 
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control – or by any enterprising governments – are 
not stymied by the TPP. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, there are deep concerns about both the process and the substance of the TPP – 
particularly as it pertains to public health. The pernicious secrecy surrounding the negotiations 
of the treaty has been unacceptable. The submissions of parties, the negotiating texts and the 
talks should be open and transparent. Politicians, health advocates, civil society groups, and 
the wider public should be able to participate in the discussions, particularly given the sweeping 
nature of the agreement. A number of the chapters of the TPP have implications for tobacco 
control measures – particularly graphic health warnings and the plain packaging of tobacco 
products. The intellectual property chapter should not adopt ‘TRIPs–Plus’ or ‘TRIPS–Double 
Plus’ standards. There is a need to ensure that member states can take a range of measures to 
address public health concerns, without interference from tobacco companies under the guise 
of intellectual property rights. The investment chapter of the TPP should be abandoned, 
especially given the weak protections for public health. There is a need to internationally 
address the abuse of state–investor dispute settlement clauses by tobacco companies. Technical 
barriers to trade could also be an issue.156 The United States Trade Representative’s text on 
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tobacco control is lamentably parochial. There is a need to ensure that the TPP in no way 
curtails, or confines, tobacco control measures as contemplated by the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control – either in its present form or in future revisions. Moreover, 
there is a need to be wary that the TPP is a mercurial treaty – a ‘living agreement’ which can 
be updated to ‘address trade issues that emerge in the future as well as new issues that arise 
with the expansion of the agreement to include new countries’.157 Future iterations of the treaty 
must not undermine global efforts to combat the tobacco epidemic. 
Laurent Huber, the executive director of Action on Smoking and Health in Washington, 
DC, makes an eloquent case for why tobacco should be excluded from the TPP altogether: 
 
Responsible trade policy acknowledges what we’ve known for decades: Tobacco is a uniquely dangerous 
product that causes death and disease from ordinary use. Tobacco is not just another agricultural product 
that deserves promotion through U.S. trade policy. It is the target of the world. The World Health 
Organization’s first and only treaty – which all of the TPPA countries, except for the United States, have 
ratified – recognizes the devastating effects of tobacco and its increasing threat to global health and 
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welfare. Including tobacco in the TPPA would undermine the success of this treaty in preventing tobacco-
related disease around the world.158 
 
Susan Liss, the executive director of the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, reflects that: 
‘Reforms to specific parts of the TPPA such as the technical barriers to trade, intellectual 
property, or investment chapters may address part of the problem, but even that would not 
prevent second guessing of legitimate efforts as being more trade restrictive than necessary.’159 
She insists that: ‘Anything other than exclusion of tobacco products may continue the chilling 
effect of threatened lawsuits, preventing countries from enacting public health protections for 
their citizens.’160 As such, there is a need to ensure that the TPP is not hijacked by Big Tobacco 
for the purposes of encouraging the trade in tobacco, and warding off the introduction of 
tobacco control measures.161 
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The plain packaging of tobacco products – and other best practices in tobacco control 
– should be embraced by all members of the Pacific Rim. 
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New Zealand, Plain Packaging, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
InfoJustice (2014) with a Coda (2016) 
Dr Matthew Rimmer 
 
 
 
The New Zealand Parliament is considering the adoption of plain packaging of tobacco 
products with the introduction of the Smoke-Free Environments (Tobacco Plain Packaging) 
Amendment Bill 2014 (NZ). There has been strong support for the measure amongst the major 
parties – including the National Party; the Maori Party; the Labor Party; and the Greens. 
The New Zealand parliamentary debate has considered matters of public health and tobacco 
control; the role of intellectual property law; and the operation of international trade and 
investment law. 
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The Minister of Health, Tony Ryall, a member of the National Party, has been proud of the 
New Zealand Government’s work in respect of tobacco control and plain packaging: ‘We have 
created a turning point in the campaign against tobacco with more effective action than ever 
before on an unprecedented scale - annual tobacco excise increases, systematic screening and 
cessation support, the end of retail displays, and the inevitability of plain packaging.’ 
 
The Associate Minister of Health, Tariana Turia, an MP for the Maori Party, has been a driving 
force behind the introduction of the legislative regime. In her first reading speech, she 
emphasized the need to address the brand imagery deployed by Big Tobacco to recruit 
consumers to use their addictive products: 
 
In essence, the decision to introduce plain packaging for tobacco products in New Zealand is all about 
the branding. It takes away the last means of promoting tobacco as a desirable product. When tobacco 
manufacturers push tobacco, they are not simply selling a stick of nicotine; they are selling status, social 
acceptance, and adventure. The design and appearance of tobacco products and, in particular, the way 
they are packaged influence people’s perceptions about these products and the desirability of smoking. 
Brand imagery demonstrably increases the appeal of tobacco brands, particularly to youth and young 
adults, helping to attract new smokers and also implying wider social approval for tobacco use. 
 
Tariana Turia observed: ‘For too long tobacco companies have been creating brands in 
advertising to persuade us to think that smoking is glamorous, fun, cool, sophisticated, and a 
part of life, knowing that they had to sell only the myth, and the nicotine addiction would take 
over.’ 
 
In her speech, Tariana Turia emphasized that the introduction of plain packaging would protect 
the ‘health of future generations while at the same time taking prudent responsibility for the 
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use of taxpayer funds.’ She stressed that plain packaging would support and complement 
existing tobacco control measures as part of a comprehensive public health strategy: 
 
This bill is about sending a very clear message to tobacco companies that this Government is serious 
about ending unnecessary deaths and poor health outcomes related to tobacco use. The intent of the 
legislation is to prevent the design and appearance of packaging and of products themselves from having 
any visual or other effect that could serve to promote the attractiveness of the product or increase the 
social appeal of smoking. 
 The plain packaging regime will tightly control the design and appearance of tobacco product 
packaging and of the products themselves by allowing the brand name and certain other manufacturer 
information to be printed on the pack, but with tight controls—for example, on the font used, its size, its 
colour, and its position on the pack. It will standardise all other design elements of tobacco product 
packaging, such as the materials, colours, and type faces or fonts that may be used. It will require the 
packaging to carry larger, more prominent, and more pertinent warning messages and graphic images, 
controlling the design and appearance of individual cigarettes and other products. 
 The colouring and wording used on tobacco packaging has been shown to create misconceptions 
that tobacco products are less harmful and that it is easier to quit than is in fact the case.  
 
Tariana Turia noted the global tobacco epidemic identified by the World Health Organization: 
‘Internationally, smoking remains the largest cause of preventable death’. She was concerned 
that tobacco use ‘contributes to profound health and social inequalities, and outcomes for Māori 
and Pasifika peoples’. Tariana Turia emphasized: ‘There is no other consumer product that is 
so widely used and that directly poses such a high level of health risk to users, particularly 
long-term users.’ She commented: ‘Quitting smoking or, even better, never smoking is the key 
to enjoying a longer and healthier life with loved ones.’ 
 
Moreover, the Associate Minister for Health emphasized that the legislative regime was 
consistent with New Zealand’s international obligations: ‘This bill will support New Zealand 
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in meeting its international obligations and commitments under the World Health Organization 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, and it will align the tobacco plain packaging 
legislation in Australia consistent with the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Agreement’. 
 
Dr Paul Hutchison – of the National Party – added that ‘the purpose of this legislation indeed 
is to introduce plain packaging for tobacco products, but particularly the aim is to reduce the 
tobacco uptake particularly among young people.’ He noted: ‘As the Hon Tariana Turia 
mentioned in her speech, branding can be very appealing to young people in its many forms 
and sorts, and in fact it can be very appealing to all people’. Hutchinson emphasized: ‘The 
whole aim of the tobacco companies is to induce that Pavlovian dog reflex whereby the person 
who sees the brand just cannot help but get stuck into the goodies, and the whole idea of this 
legislation is indeed to help reduce the glamorisation of packaging that the tobacco companies 
have been just so very happy to use, despite the harm tobacco causes.’ Dr Paul Hutchison 
vowed that his party would defend the tobacco control measures in international trade debates: 
‘We have clearly signalled that we will not compromise our sovereign right to protect the public 
health of our people.’ He stressed: ‘This legislation is another step in protecting the public’s 
health from the proven harms of tobacco.’ 
 
Iain Lees-Galloway – representing Labour for Palmerston North – welcomed the introduction 
of plain packaging of tobacco products. He emphasized that the Labour Party had a proud 
record on public health and tobacco control: ‘It goes right back, of course, to 1989-90, when 
the Smoke-free Environments Act, the Act that this bill amends, was first passed by the Labour 
Government under then health Minister Helen Clark’. He noted: ‘This is just another step in a 
long line of measures that have over the last three decades moved us towards a smoke-free 
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future, but now we have the absolute goal that we want New Zealand to be smoke-free by 
2025’. Lees-Galloway commented that plain packaging would be a useful, effective measure: 
 
There is no reason for branding to be used to differentiate cigarettes, because tobacco is tobacco is 
tobacco. It does not matter what you wrap it up in; it kills. Five thousand people are killed every year as 
a result of tobacco-related diseases. It kills around half its users. That is not a normal product that ought 
to be treated normally like any other consumable. It does not belong in dairies next to the bread and the 
milk and the lollies. And it does not deserve to have branding designed to entice young people to use this 
lethal product.  
 
Lees-Galloway observed: ‘The tobacco industry wails and cries every time a measure like this 
is implemented, and the more it wails, the more I am convinced that we are doing the right 
thing’. He supported the Smoke-free Environments (Tobacco Plain Packaging) Amendment 
Bill 2014 (NZ): ‘What it seeks to do is to get rid of the last bastion of tobacco advertising.’ 
 
In a powerful speech, Clare Curran – representing Labour in Dunedin South – noted the 
insidious influence of marketing by the tobacco industry: ‘That is why we have so many people 
in our country and in our world who smoke—because of the really clever marketing and 
because the product is so addictive.’ She applauded the introduction of plain packaging of 
tobacco products in Australia, and the ruling of the High Court of Australia that the regime was 
constitutional. Clare Curran offered a devastating critique of Big Tobacco’s arguments about 
trade and intellectual property: 
 
I want to say that the argument that is used by big tobacco—the apologists that pretend that this is a 
debate about intellectual property rights or removing barriers to trade—is wrong and that that has been 
proven. The sovereign right of Parliament to make its own laws on matters of public interest should be 
something that we should all fight for. I want to refer quickly to a paper called ‘Packaging phoney 
56 
 
intellectual property claims. How multinational tobacco companies colluded to use trade and intellectual 
property arguments they knew were phoney to oppose plain packaging and larger health warnings. And 
how governments fell for their chicanery.’ I urge everybody to track down this paper and to read it, 
because it shows that the companies decided to fight plain packaging on trade grounds because it 
provided them a more solid footing than allowing health issues to enter the debate.  
 
Highlighting the ruling of the High Court of Australia, Clare Curran concluded: ‘We should 
not be taking notice of Big Tobacco’s argument that this is an intellectual property argument, 
because it is not. There is no basis in law for that argument.’ 
 
Phil Goff – representing Labour in Mt Roskill – provided a critique of the trade arguments of 
Big Tobacco and its fellow travellers. 
 
It is a condemnation of not only the tobacco industry but the fellow travellers and the apologists for that 
industry, who would pretend that they can dictate to this country about what we should do in terms of 
tobacco promotion. It is a long list: the Emergency Committee for American Trade, the National 
Association of Manufacturers, the National Foreign Trade Council, the US-ASEAN Business Council, 
the US Chamber of Commerce, and the United States Council for International Business. Shame on those 
groups, which in many other aspects of their work do responsible work, that they should act as apologists 
for a product that kills people. They may pretend that the debate is about intellectual property. They may 
pretend that the debate is about removing barriers to trade. I am a believer in reasonable protection for 
intellectual property and I am a strong believer that we should remove barriers to trade, but neither 
argument stacks up to defend the promotion of a product that kills people if used as the manufacturer 
intends. Neither argument stands up. They are red herrings. Those councils, those vested interest groups, 
should butt out of our debate. New Zealand, as every country does, must have the sovereign right to 
legislate and to regulate for the public good. 
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Goff encouraged the New Zealand Parliament: ‘We should not lack the courage to confront the 
vested interests that promote for their own material benefit the peddling of tobacco as a lethal 
product.’ He emphasized that the regime is aligned with the World Health Organization 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: ‘We should not be frightened to bring this 
legislation in on the date that we consider appropriate and to take on those corporates, because 
we would have the support of the World Health Organization.’ He was rightly sceptical of 
challenges to Australia’s plain packaging regime under the World Trade Organization: ‘I do 
not believe for a moment that another international body, the World Trade Organization, would 
in the end defend the right of companies to kill people with their products.’ Goff highlighted 
the need to ensure that tobacco control measures – such as the plain packaging of tobacco 
products – were not undermined by the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 
 
Lees-Galloway emphasized the need for transparency in respect of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership:  ‘The real concern is that the Trans-Pacific Partnership will foist upon New 
Zealand rules and regulations that stop us from doing exactly this, which is to legislate in the 
best interests of the public health of New Zealanders’. He warned of the danger of investor-
state dispute settlement regimes: ‘We are watching Australia closely, but I want New 
Zealanders to understand that the agreement that Australia has with Hong Kong was poorly 
drafted in this area and left Australia exposed to the type of litigation that it is facing’. 
 
Lees-Galloway observed: ‘We need to know whether the Trans-Pacific Partnership will have 
any bearing on the implantation of this legislation, and we on this side of the House are 
concerned that the reason the Government does not want this legislation to be implemented as 
soon as it is passed by Parliament, and instead is handing that right over to itself, the 
Government, is that it wants to keep in the back pocket the opportunity not to enforce this 
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legislation, in the event that it sells off to American interests that are pushing their agenda 
through the Trans-Pacific Partnership our right—our Sovereign right—to legislate in the 
interests of the public health of New Zealanders.’ He concluded: ‘New Zealand is a Sovereign 
nation that ought to be able to say that we do not accept that 5,000 of our citizens are killed 
every year by tobacco, and that we do not accept that the tobacco industry has the right to push 
its product on to youngsters to try to get them hooked at an early age so that when they do make 
the decision that they want not to smoke any more, they are addicted to nicotine and unable to 
get away from the habit’. The politician stressed: ‘We do not want the tobacco industry to be 
able to do that, and we do not want to give up our right to regulate in the interests of New 
Zealanders.’ 
 
Metiria Turei – the co-leader of the New Zealand Greens – expressed her concern about the 
health impacts of tobacco:  ‘For every person I love who smokes cigarettes, that cigarette is a 
direct threat to their life’. She observed: ‘That cigarette increases their chances of dying of 
some horrible disease much, much younger than they would otherwise’. She was also 
concerned that tobacco had a particularly significant and harmful impact on Maori 
communities.  Turei commented: ‘What is most important to me about this legislation is that it 
controls the industry.’ She emphasized: 
 
We do have controls on advertising and other forms of regulatory control over the industry, but more is 
needed and this is a great first step. We—the country, the Government, the community—are being 
threatened by the tobacco industry. We saw in today’s paper that there are further threats by the tobacco 
industry for the consequences of this policy. We are quite right in saying, so be it, bring it on. We are in 
the job of making good policy for the health and well-being of our country, and none of us make any 
apologies for that whatsoever. If that causes a cost to an industry that peddles a drug that kills, well then 
so be it. They bear that cost. They are in that industry. That is a cost that they have to take. 
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Turei dismissed the arguments of Big Tobacco about plain packaging of tobacco products. She 
noted: ‘Actually, the argument by them really was: we want to keep our branding, we want to 
keep control of the industry.’ 
 
Kevin Hague – the spokesperson on Health for the New Zealand Greens – emphasized that 
nothing is ‘more fundamental to the role of a Government than to prevent the death of its 
citizens’. He hoped that the New Zealand Government implemented plain packaging of tobacco 
products, without delay or hesitation: 
 
In the face of the size of this problem and the role that this measure can play in solving that problem I do 
not believe that that kind of delay can possibly be acceptable. Tobacco companies are scared of this bill. 
They are scared of this measure. Indeed, it falls into a pattern that has existed for every one of the tobacco 
control measures that has been implemented in every country every time. Tobacco companies have 
fought them tooth and nail and the ferocity of their fighting has been proportional to the likely 
effectiveness of the measure being considered. Their sole motivation is profit maximisation. That is not 
a goal that our State, our Parliament ought to share. 
 
Kevin Hague stressed that ‘every nation has the sovereign right to protect the health of its 
people.’ He warned that ‘Delaying implementation is caving in to the threats, extortion, and 
delaying tactics of an evil industry.’ 
 
Barbara Stewart of NZ First expressed uncertainties about the legislation, and its impact upon 
public health. She noted: ‘This is a very thought-provoking piece of legislation. I am not a 
smoker.’ She observed: ‘It is important, we believe, to get the views of the submitters on a bill 
such as this, because it can have unintended consequences, both positive and negative.’ 
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John Banks – the leader of ACT – provided some opposition to the introduction of plain 
packaging of tobacco products. He asserted that the plain packaging of tobacco products 
violated the intellectual property rights of tobacco companies: 
 
This bill guts the intellectual property rights of tobacco companies. Some will ask: well, who cares? But 
do we want to gut the intellectual property rights of KFC or Red Bull sugar drinks? KFC and Red Bull 
sugar drinks are putting this country’s level of obesity up at the top of the OECD. They help to contribute 
to that. It may be seen as a long bow, but the removal of intellectual property rights to the names and 
brandings of their products from tobacco companies without compensation is wrong, because which 
international company selling products that are bad for our health will be the next target? The State is 
effectively seizing their property because it does not like the health effects of their still lawful business. 
It is still a lawful business. 
 
Such arguments are misconceived and ill-founded. In a decisive 6-1 majority, the High Court 
of Australia emphasized that intellectual property was designed to serve larger public interests 
– such as the protection of public health. The High Court of Australia held that plain packaging 
did not constitute an acquisition of property. Rejecting ‘slippery slope’ arguments by the 
tobacco industry, the High Court of Australia also observed that its decision was focused upon 
tobacco control, rather than any other field of regulation – such as food labelling or soft drink 
labelling. 
 
In light of this debate, the New Zealand Parliament should introduce the plain packaging of 
tobacco products in order to protect the public health of its citizens. Such a measure would help 
fulfil New Zealand’s obligations under the World Health Organization Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control 2003 – in particular, Articles 11 and 13 of the agreement, and the 
accompanying guidelines. The New Zealand Parliament should introduce plain packaging of 
tobacco products without delay or prevarication. The Australian Government has a strong case 
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in defending the plain packaging of tobacco products under both the TRIPS Agreement 1994 
and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 1994. Australia’s opponents have been 
engaged in dilatory tactics, and have been seeking to stall or delay the disputes. 
 
The New Zealand Parliament should take note of the debate in the Australian Parliament over 
the plain packaging of tobacco products, and emulate the Australian legislative model of The 
Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth). The New Zealand Parliament should also take heed 
of the decisive ruling of the High Court of Australia – which decisively rejected the intellectual 
property arguments of Big Tobacco about the plain packaging of tobacco products. The New 
Zealand Parliament should also ensure that its plain packaging regime is not exposed to 
challenge by tobacco companies under investor-state dispute settlement clauses. There is a need 
to guarantee that the Trans-Pacific Partnership does not undermine tobacco control measures 
in the Pacific Rim. New Zealand should play a leadership role in the Pacific, and promote the 
adoption of measures, such as graphic health warnings, and the plain packaging of tobacco 
products in the region. 
 
Coda 
 
In December 2015, New Zealand nurses called upon the New Zealand Government to 
implement plain packaging of tobacco products, after Australia’s victory in an investor-state 
dispute settlement battle with Philip Morris. NZNO Kaiwhakahaere Kerri Nuku commented: 
 
The New Zealand Government has been very clear that it was ‘wait and see’ for plain packaging over 
here, depending on the outcome of the Philip Morris case in Australia. Today the court proved the tobacco 
giant had no leg to stand on, and there is no further reason to delay introducing plain packaging in New 
Zealand. Time lost is lives lost.  I’m calling on the Government to announce plain packaging laws here 
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immediately. Those lured to smoke by tobacco companies’ marketing are predominantly young, MÄori 
and female. Any further delays will be responsible for more grieving whÄnau missing out on years with 
their daughters, sisters and mums. The best Christmas present the Government could give whÄ nau is 
announcing plain packaging today.162 
 
In February 2016, New Zealand Prime Minister John Key indicated that he would finally 
implement plain packaging of tobacco products by the end of the year.163 
 
The New Zealand Parliament passed its plain packaging of tobacco products scheme in 
September 2016 with the passage of the Smoke-Free Environments (Tobacco Plain Packaging 
Bill) 2016 (Cth).164 The Hon. Peseta Sam Lotu-Iiga – the Associate Minister of Health – 
discussed the importance of the historic bill: 
 
We also know that there is no other product that is as widely used and that directly poses as high a level 
of risk to users as tobacco. This standardised packaging bill is the next significant step to reduce the 
devastating harm that leads to between 4,500 and 5,000 premature deaths every year. It is true that there 
are already significant restrictions on advertising and promotion. There are increases in taxation that I 
brought to this House earlier this year, and we also have a consultation paper out on e-cigarettes, which 
is being consulted on currently, but we know that much more is needed. 
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In 1996, 25 percent of adults in New Zealand smoked on a daily basis. Today, that figure is 
around 15 percent, and we are heading towards 5 percent, which is deemed to be the smoke-free target. 
This bill takes away the last means of promoting tobacco as a desirable product. It stops the promotion 
of smoking as cool, fun, and glamorous, and it sends a clear message—a clear message—that this 
Government is serious about ending premature deaths related to tobacco use. Around 13 people die 
prematurely every day from smoking-related illnesses—that is, 13 per day.165 
 
The Hon. Peseta Sam Lotu-Iiga commented: ‘Standardised packaging ensures nothing on the 
pack undermines the impact of the mandatory graphic picture warnings’.166 He observed: ‘This 
is a bill to protect children and young people from being tempted to try smoking cigarettes.’167 
The Hon. Peseta Sam Lotu-Iiga commented: ‘In far too many cases a quick puff leads to a 
lifelong struggle with nicotine addiction, with subsequent major health consequences.’168 
 
The Hon. Peseta Sam Lotu-Iiga noted: ‘The bill allows manufacturers to print information and 
brand names on the packs, but only in a tightly controlled way’.169 He stressed: ‘Along with 
the existing suite of tobacco control measures and quit-smoking services, standardised 
packaging is a logical step towards our 2025 goal.’170 The Associate Minister for Health 
highlighted the public health revolution: ‘In passing the bill, this House will be on the right 
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side of history and in good company with other countries that are going down the same path.’171 
He noted: 
 
We know that the United Kingdom, France, Ireland, and Canada are at various points in their journey 
towards standardised packaging. Australia has had standardised packaging in place since December 
2012, and in less than 4 years this has already reduced the number of smokers by at least 108,000 
people. These results come from an econometrics study published in the Australian Government's post-
implementation review. The study found the move to plain packaging, or standardised packaging, with 
large health warnings was responsible for 0.55 percentage points out of the 2.2 percentage point decline 
in smoking prevalence over the study period. In other words, standardised packaging alone was 
responsible for one quarter of the measured decline, and that is a measure that is making a real 
difference to our friends across the Tasman. Standardised cigarette packs are already starting to appear 
on shelves in France and the UK in advance of them coming into full force in January and May of next 
year, respectively.172 
 
The New Zealand Minister concluded that ‘The bill will undoubtedly improve the health of 
New Zealanders and save lives’.173 He hoped: ‘Along with tobacco excise increases and 
restrictions already in place, this move towards standardised packaging will help people to quit 
and prevent others from smoking. I commend this bill to the House.’174 
 
The Hon. Annette King – the Deputy Leader of the New Zealand Labor Party – lamented that 
New Zealand had not acted sooner in implementing plain packaging of tobacco products: 
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I sometimes have a dig at the Australians, even though my grandchildren are now Australian, but I have 
to say that I felt rather miffed that the Australians beat us in a health policy, because we have led them 
for generations. They have followed much of what New Zealand does because we are a small, nimble 
nation that is able to do things as a nationwide service. We do not have to worry about state and Federal 
Governments, and some funding for hospitals, some funding for primary care, and some funding for 
elder care in different jurisdictions. We can go ahead and put together the sort of health policy we want 
to implement. They have admired us, and when I went to those ministerial councils, they were a little 
jealous that we are able to do so much because we are a small, nimble country. But we were beaten by 
the Australians in the passage of this bill. They said: "We couldn't give a damn what the WTO thinks. 
We believe that the health of our Australians is more important than what some tobacco company might 
think." So they went ahead and they passed the legislation.175 
 
Her colleague, the Hon. Iain Lees-Galloway, commented: ‘[T]he evidence shows us—and 
there is really strong evidence in favour of standardised packaging, no matter what the tobacco 
industry tries to tell us—is that people who see a plain packet remember the message in the 
graphic warning a lot more clearly than they do when it is jumbled in with the branding of the 
cigarette brand itself.’176 
 
The Hon. Kevin Hague of the NZ Greens reflected upon the tactics and strategy of the tobacco 
industry in respect of delaying the introduction of tobacco control measures: 
 
In the submissions that the select committee heard, the ones from the tobacco companies themselves 
and from their proxies were notable because they illustrated a strategy that the tobacco industry has 
followed since the 1950s, when Doll and Hill first conclusively showed the link between tobacco 
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consumption and lung cancer. First of all, tobacco companies denied that such a link existed. They then 
tried to throw into the mix their own research, to add confusion to the picture. We actually see the sugar 
industry following precisely that path now, and we see the oil and fossil fuel industries doing the same 
on climate change. They are following the game plan of the tobacco industry, and right now the tobacco 
industry has got to the point where the phase of the strategy they are pursuing is delayed. So that is 
what sits behind the delay that we have seen on this bill. The tobacco industry, which has opposed 
every single measure intended to curb tobacco-related harm in this country, will do the same on all of 
those other measures intended to reach a smoke-free Aotearoa 2025. It will require leadership and 
courage from the Government to stand up to those tobacco companies. Does the Government have that? 
I wonder.177 
 
He was of the view that the delays to the introduction of plain packaging in New Zealand were 
needless. 
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Canada (2016) 
 
 
The Heart and Stroke Foundation 
 
The New Canadian Government has promised the introduction of plain packaging of tobacco 
products.178 The Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has requested his Minister for Health Dr Jane 
Philpott to ‘Introduce plain packaging requirements for tobacco products, similar to those in 
Australia and the United Kingdom.’179 
 
The Montreal Gazette applauded the move by the new Trudeau Government: 
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The federal government’s plan to impose plain packaging on cigarettes is a welcome addition to the long 
list of measures already taken to make smoking unattractive, inconvenient, expensive and socially 
unacceptable. And the plan, coupled with Quebec’s latest anti-smoking legislation — adopted 
unanimously by the National Assembly in November — promises to make this province a leader in the 
fight against tobacco use. 
 Under the federal initiative, tobacco companies will be forced to remove their logos and colours 
from cigarette packs, leaving only the brand name in uniform lettering along with large, graphic health 
warnings already mandated by the government. Quebec’s law, meanwhile, extends the ban on smoking 
to places that include bar and restaurant terrasses, and cars containing children, and sets restrictions on 
the size of cigarette packs so they cannot be made to look like iPods or lipstick, among other measures. 
The federal and provincial measures have been applauded by anti-smoking advocates and health groups. 
 It’s unclear when the new federal rules will kick in, though the sooner, the better, given that 
smoking is responsible for one-third of cancers in Canada. Any move that stands to help smokers kick 
the habit — and prevent young people from picking it up — warrants urgent action. Anti-smoking groups 
say existing cigarette packs serve as colourful “mini-billboards” for tobacco that find their way into 
schoolyards, and that every day there are young people who take up smoking despite the large health 
warnings on the packaging. It’s a promising sign that Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has mandated Health 
Minister Jane Philpott to make the file one of her top priorities.180 
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The Canadian Cancer Society is also enthusiastic about the Liberal Pledge to demand plain 
packaging of tobacco products.181 The Heart and Stroke Foundation has encouraged the 
adoption of plain and standardised packaging.182 
 
The Canadian Government has put out a tender to explore the introduction of plain packaging 
of tobacco products.183 Rob Cunningham, a senior policy analyst with the Canadian Cancer 
Society, observed: 
It’s very positive that the government is moving ahead. The sooner we have tobacco plain packaging, the 
sooner we can have the health benefits. Plain packaging will reduce the appeal of tobacco packages and 
brands. Right now, tobacco companies are using brand colours and logos to make cigarettes more 
attractive. That might include mountain scenes or feminine pastels, it might include super-slim packages 
targeted at women.184 
 
 
Cunningham observed that the legal actions by Big Tobacco have failed elsewhere: ‘The 
tobacco companies may threaten, or take the Canadian government to court, but the tobacco 
companies will lose.’185 He observed: ‘The fact that the companies oppose this is a further 
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signal of its impact’.186 Cunningham noted: ‘If it wasn’t going to work, why would they oppose 
it?’187 
 
The evidence from Australia has been that plain packaging of tobacco products has been an 
effective means of reducing tobacco consumption.188 
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UNITED KINGDOM HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE (2016) 
 
Moreover, the United Kingdom Government successfully defended its plain packaging of 
tobacco products system against a challenge by Big Tobacco companies in the High Court.189 
 
Justice Green considered the wide array of substantive arguments by the tobacco industry 
against plain packaging of tobacco products: 
 
The present challenge in this jurisdiction is the first occasion that the full gamut of arguments 
surrounding standardised packaging has been raised. These arguments range far and wide and focus 
(inter alia) upon: (a) the scope and effect of relevant international treaties and conventions; (b) the 
scope and effect of EU law relating to tobacco control; (c) the scope and effect of EU law relating to 
national and Community trade marks; (d) the jurisdictional competence of Member States of the EU to 
enact any legislation which adversely affects the rights of trade mark users; (e) the legality (vires) of 
the Regulations; (f) the scope and effect of international, EU and domestic laws on the expropriation 
of property; (g) the legality of the consultative procedure adopted by the United Kingdom leading up 
to the adoption by Parliament of the disputed legislation; (h) the efficacy of the chosen policy in terms 
of actual health outputs; (i) the necessity for the Regulations; (j) whether the legislation strikes a fair 
balance between the competing interests arising; (k) the compatibility of the Regulations with EU rules 
on the free movement of goods and the right to operate a business; (l) the applicability of various 
provisions of the Fundamental Charter; and (m) the approach to be adopted towards the assessment of 
expert evidence in this field both under international law and under domestic civil law. It has seemed 
to me that no even remotely or marginally arguable stone has been left unturned. 190 
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The judge systematically rejects the arguments by the tobacco industry against plain packaging 
of tobacco products. 
 
Justice Green is particularly damning about the poor quality of the evidence presented by the 
tobacco industry: 
 
In my judgment the Government was entitled to conclude that the tobacco companies’ evidence did fall 
below acceptable standards during the consultation. The conclusions which have arisen from the US 
courts about the sharp discord between what the tobacco companies think inside their own four walls 
and what they then say to the outside world (especially through experts), are so damning and the 
evidence of the discord so compelling and far reaching that it is not at all surprising that the WHO 
concluded that there was an evidence base upon which to found their recommendations to contracting 
states to apply vigilance and demand accountability and transparency in their dealing with the tobacco 
companies. 
In coming to this conclusion I have not applied any sui generis rule which singles out the tobacco 
companies for particular and adverse treatment. The requirement that experts should act with 
transparency and accountability is hardly surprising. It is in fact the cornerstone of the “best practice” 
regimes applied by regulators worldwide when they seek to evaluate empirical evidence advanced by 
companies (outside the field of tobacco control) under investigation. Indeed, one of the Claimants’ own 
experts described the principles of transparency and openness as the “foundational tablets of the 
scientific enterprise”. The approach now adopted by the international research community and by 
regulators represents common sense rules of evaluation which resonate strongly in a case such as the 
present. Further these principles are consistent with the obligations which experts and parties owe to 
the Court and which are required under the Civil Procedure Rules (“CPR”) which govern civil litigation 
in this jurisdiction. 
I have accordingly sought to apply these principles to all of the evidence before me, from 
whatever source. I have applied the sorts of methodological standards that in my judgment are world-
wide norms and which make sense to apply to the present facts. As a generality, the Claimants’ evidence 
is largely: not peer reviewed; frequently not tendered with a statement of truth or declaration that 
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complies with the CPR; almost universally prepared without any reference to the internal 
documentation or data of the tobacco companies themselves; either ignores or airily dismisses the 
worldwide research and literature base which contradicts evidence tendered by the tobacco industry; 
and, is frequently unverifiable. I say “largely” because the quality of the evidence submitted to this 
Court (which included all of that tendered during the consultation) was sometimes of remarkably 
variable quality. Some of it was wholly untenable and resembled diatribe rather than expert opinion; 
but some was of high quality, albeit that I am still critical of it, for instance, because it ignores internal 
documents or was unverifiable.191 
 
Justice Green was scathing about the demands of the tobacco companies for compensation: 
 
If I am wrong in this and the Claimants’ rights have been expropriated I have then to decide whether 
compensation should be paid. The law indicates that in cases of true expropriation full compensation 
is payable save in “exceptional” circumstances. In my judgment it is quite obvious that the 
circumstances are exceptional. Tobacco usage is classified as a health evil, albeit that it remains lawful. 
There is no precedent where the law has provided compensation for the suppression of a property right 
which facilitates and furthers, quite deliberately, a health epidemic. And moreover, a health epidemic 
which imposes vast negative health and other costs upon the very State that is then being expected to 
compensate the property right holder for ceasing to facilitate the epidemic.192 
 
Justice Green also considered the larger international context of the debate over the plain 
packaging of tobacco products. The judge emphasized that the TRIPS Agreement 1994 and the 
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control should be seen as mutually compatible: 
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It is plain from the above that intellectual property rights are not absolute and must be balanced against 
other competing public interests. In particular the right to use a trade mark can, under national law, 
yield to limitations imposed in the pursuit of superior public policy considerations. There is no 
canonical list of the public interests that may or may not be resorted to on the part of contracting states 
to limit intellectual property rights and a good deal of discretion is accorded to the signatories. What is 
however clear is that intellectual property rights can be derogated from in the name of public health 
since this is one of the few public interests which is explicitly identified. It is a point I return to later 
but it is worth emphasising here: For all the above reasons TRIPS and the FCTC can be read together 
without any risk of them colliding or being mutually inconsistent. 193 
 
The judge comments: ‘TRIPS makes it abundantly clear that the scope and effect, including 
usage, of intellectual property rights may be subject to limitations on grounds of public health; 
and the TPD which is an internal market (shared competence) measure expressly aspires to be 
compliant with relevant international law obligations (such as TRIPS)’. 194 The judge concludes 
that the regulations are consistent with the TRIPS Agreement 1994. 
 
The decision was welcomed in the United Kingdom by public health advocates.195 ‘This 
landmark judgment is a crushing defeat for the tobacco industry and fully justifies the 
government’s determination to go ahead with the introduction of standardised packaging,’ said 
Deborah Arnott, chief executive of the charity Ash (Action on Smoking and Health).’ She 
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lamented that ‘Millions of pounds have been spent on some of the country’s most expensive 
lawyers in the hope of blocking the policy’.196 She concluded: ‘This disgraceful effort to 
privilege tobacco business interests over public health has rightly failed utterly.’197 Sir Harpal 
Kumar, chief executive of Cancer Research UK, said it was an important milestone. ‘It’s the 
beginning of the end for packaging that masks a deadly and addictive product. It’s taken many 
years to get to this point and it reflects a huge effort aimed at protecting children from tobacco 
marketing.’198 
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INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT OUTCOMES IN DISPUTES 
BETWEEN PHILIP MORRIS WITH AUSTRALIA AND URUGUAY (2016) 
 
A. Philip Morris vs Australia 
 
After moving the shares of its Australian subsidiary to Hong Kong, Philip Morris brought a 
contrived investor-state arbitration claim under the Australia-Hong Kong Agreement on the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments 1993.199 The economist, Peter Martin, noted: ‘The 
almost comic attempt to get mileage out of the treaty (moving from Australia to Hong Kong in 
order to complain that it was being discriminated against because it was from Hong Kong) 
masks a broader, more serious attempt to turn trade treaties into instruments that allow 
corporations to sue governments’.200 
 
Professor Tania Voon and Professor Andrew Mitchell were sceptical of such claims by the 
tobacco industry.201 Professor Mark Davison quipped: ‘It appears that PMA’s claim for 
‘billions of Australian dollars’ has about as much life as the parrot in the famous Monty Python 
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sketch.’202 Dr Kyla Tienhaara from the Australian National University observed: ‘The Philip 
Morris case perfectly highlights the many problems with investment arbitration, while the 
purported benefits of the system remain unproven.’203 She contends that the government also 
should maintain its policy against the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement procedures 
in trade and investment agreements. 
 
Professor Thomas Faunce lamented of investment tribunals: ‘Such off-shore investment 
tribunals are not accountable to the Australian populace and have extremely limited capacity 
to refer to governance arrangements directly endorsed by Australian citizens.’204 
 
Professor Mark Davison of Monash University has provided an extended analysis of the 
bilateral investment dispute between Australia and Philip Morris Asia.205 He comments: 
 
 
The BIT dispute between Australia and PMA is primarily a dispute about the nature of PMA’s intellectual 
property rights and entitlements and the extent, if any, to which the treatment of that intellectual property 
by the TPP contravenes one or more of the obligations imposed on the Australian government by the 
                                                          
202  Mark Davison, ‘Big Tobacco vs. Australia: Philip Morris Scores an Own Goal’, The Conversation, 20 
January 2012, http://theconversation.edu.au/big-tobacco-vs-australia-philip-morris-scores-an-own-goal-4967  
203  Kyla Tienhaara, ‘Government Wins First Battle in Plain Packaging War’, The Conversation, 13 August 
2012, https://theconversation.edu.au/government-wins-first-battle-in-plain-packaging-war-8855  
204  Thomas Faunce, ‘An Affront to the Rule of Law: International Tribunals to Decide on Plain Packaging’, 
The Conversation, 29 August 2012, http://theconversation.edu.au/an-affront-to-the-rule-of-law-international-
tribunals-to-decide-on-plain-packaging-8968  
205  Mark Davison, ‘The Bilateral Investment Treaty Dispute between Australia and Philip Morris Asia: What 
Rights are Relevant and How Have they Been Affected?’ (2012) 9 (5) Transnational Dispute Management 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2214833 
78 
 
BIT. While PMA does not directly hold any intellectual property in Australia, it owns companies that do. 
It owns 100% of the shares in Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd which, in turn, owns 100% of the shares in 
PML. PML either owns or holds licences to use in Australia some key trademarks for cigarettes and other 
intellectual property. In particular, PML holds a licence from Philip Morris Brands Sarl (a Swiss 
company) to use trademarks such as Alpine, Longbeach and Marlboro. PML also owns the registered 
trademark Peter Jackson. It is the impact of the TPP on that intellectual property that is the primary source 
of the complaint by PMA. While it claims that its shareholdings will be affected, that effect is the direct 
consequence of the alleged impact on the intellectual property of its subsidiary, PML. There are multiple 
potential responses to the claims of PMA.206 
 
Davison contends that the ruling of the High Court of Australia has implications for the 
investment dispute: ‘While the BIT is a different legal beast from the Australian Constitution, 
it is difficult to see how a conclusion could be reached that there has been expropriation if that 
term is interpreted, in essence, as involving an acquisition of property.’207 
 
The Australian Government provided a robust defence of its plain packaging of tobacco 
products.208 The Australian Government commented in its response to the Notice of 
Arbitration in 2011: 
 
The plain packaging legislation forms part of a comprehensive government strategy to reduce smoking 
rates in Australia. This strategy is designed to address one of the leading causes of preventable death 
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and disease in Australia, which kills around 15,000 Australians each year, causes chronic disease for 
many others and is a significant burden both on productivity and on Australia’s health-care system. The 
implementation of these measures is a legitimate exercise of the Australian Government’s regulatory 
powers to protect the health of its citizens.209 
 
Australia argued that Article 10 of the bilateral investment treaty ‘does not confer jurisdiction 
on an arbitral tribunal to determine pre-existing disputes that have been re-packaged as BIT 
claims many months after the relevant measure has been announced.’210 Moreover, Australia 
argued that, in any case, ‘the plain packaging legislation cannot be regarded as a breach of any 
of the substantive protections under the BIT.’211 In its view, ‘PM Asia made a decision to 
acquire shares in PM Australia in full knowledge that the decision had been announced by the 
Australian Government to introduce plain packaging.’212 
 
There was a long-running procedural dispute between Australia and Philip Morris, with a larger 
number of procedural decisions. In Procedural Order No. 8, the tribunal decided to bifurcate 
the dispute – and deal with preliminary objections by Australia would be dealt with in a first 
phase. Australia had argued that the commencement of the arbitration shortly after the 
claimant’s restructuring constituted an abuse of rights. 
                                                          
209  Ibid., 1. 
210  Ibid., 2. 
211  Ibid., 2. 
212  Ibid., 2-3. 
80 
 
On 18 December 2015, the arbitration tribunal issued a unanimous decision, finding that the 
tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear Philip Morris Asia's claim. 213 
 
On 17 May 2016, the tribunal published the decision (albeit with the parties' confidential 
information redacted). The tribunal found that Philip Morris Asia's claim was an abuse of 
process and an abuse of rights. The tribunal was concerned that Philip Morris Asia acquired an 
Australian subsidiary, Philip Morris (Australia) Limited, for the purpose of initiating 
arbitration under the Hong Kong Agreement challenging Australia's tobacco plain packaging 
laws.  
 
In its Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the tribunal addressed three objections. While 
the tribunal rejected Australia’s first two preliminary objections, it upheld the third objection, 
ruling: 
“the initiation of this arbitration constitutes an abuse of rights, as the corporate restructuring by which 
the Claimant acquired the Australian subsidiaries occurred at a time when there was a reasonable 
prospect that the dispute would materialise and as it was carried out for the principal, if not sole, purpose 
of gaining Treaty protection. Accordingly, the claims raised in this arbitration are inadmissible and the 
Tribunal is precluded from exercising jurisdiction over this dispute.”214 
 
In its conclusion, the Tribunal held: 
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In view of the above considerations, the Tribunal concludes that the commencement of treaty based 
investor-State arbitration constitutes an abuse of right (or abuse of process) when an investor has 
changed its corporate structure to gain the protection of an investment treaty at a point in time where a 
dispute was foreseeable. A dispute is foreseeable when there is a reasonable prospect that a measure 
that may give rise to a treaty claim will materialise.215 
 
The Tribunal elaborated that the adoption of plain packaging of tobacco products in Australia 
was foreseeable: 
 
In the present case, the Tribunal has found that the adoption of the Plain Packaging Measures was 
foreseeable well before the Claimant’s decision to restructure was taken (let alone implemented). On 
29 April 2010, Australia’s Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and Health Minister Roxon unequivocally 
announced the Government’s intention to introduce Plain Packaging Measures. In the Tribunal’s view, 
there was no uncertainty about the Government’s intention to introduce plain packaging as of that point. 
Accordingly, from that date, there was at least a reasonable prospect that legislation equivalent to the 
Plain Packaging Measures would eventually be enacted and a dispute would arise. Political 
developments after 29 April 2010 did not involve any change in the intention of the Government to 
introduce Plain Packaging Measures and, thus, were not such as to change the foreseeability 
assessment.216 
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The Tribunal also commented: 
 
The Tribunal’s conclusion is reinforced by a review of the evidence regarding the Claimant’s professed 
alternative reasons for the restructuring. The record indeed shows that the principal, if not sole, purpose 
of the restructuring was to gain protection under the Treaty in respect of the very measures that form 
the subject matter of the present arbitration. For the Tribunal, the adoption of the Plain Packaging 
Measures was not only foreseeable but actually foreseen by the Claimant when it chose to change its 
corporate structure.217 
 
The Tribunal concluded accordingly: 
 
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Tribunal cannot but conclude that the initiation of this 
arbitration constitutes an abuse of rights, as the corporate restructuring by which the Claimant acquired 
the Australian subsidiaries occurred at a time when there was a reasonable prospect that the dispute 
would materialise and as it was carried out for the principal, if not sole, purpose of gaining Treaty 
protection. Accordingly, the claims raised in this arbitration are inadmissible and the Tribunal is 
precluded from exercising jurisdiction over this dispute.218 
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In late 2015, Australia was successful in defending its plain packaging of tobacco products in 
an investor-state dispute settlement dispute with Philip Morris.219 Minister Fiona Nash 
commented: 
 
We welcome the unanimous decision by the tribunal agreeing with Australia's position that it has no 
jurisdiction to hear Philip Morris' claim. Smoking does untold harm to Australians, causing deaths from 
cancer, lung and heart disease, and hurting families. The Coalition government has powered ahead with 
plain packaging and invested in reducing smoking rates across the board.220 
 
Labor's Health spokeswoman, Catherine King, has paid tribute to the Labor politicians who 
brought in the laws: ‘This is a great vindication of the work by (former Labor Attorney-
General) Nicola Roxon and Tanya Plibersek to promote world leading health.’221 She 
emphasized: This is a fantastic public health win.’222 The details of the dispute’s resolution 
remain murky, though.223 
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The Greens’ Trade spokesman Senator Peter Whish-Wilson reflected upon the significance of 
the dispute: 
 
Plain packaging has proven to be an effective public policy tool to reduce smoking rates in Australia. 
Unfortunately as a nation we have signed up to trade and investment treaties that have given corporations 
the right to sue us for making laws that might impinge on a foreign corporation’s profits. In this case 
particular case Australia has dodged a bullet because the tribunal has decided they don’t have jurisdiction 
to decide on this piece of litigation. However, because Australia has signed up to ISDS mechanisms with 
China, Korea and the United States (via the Trans-Pacific Partnership) we are going to see so much more 
of this from now on. The Liberal Government has exposed Australia to a spate of claims as all the major 
multinationals with investments in Australia now have company headquarters located in countries with 
access to ISDS.224 
 
He concluded: ‘ISDS is the Damocles Sword hanging over Australia's sovereignty and our 
right to legislate in the public interest. We have reportedly spent over $50 million of taxpayer 
dollars to successfully defend our democratic decisions in this plain packaging case, who 
knows what the result will be next time.’225 
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Dr Kyla Tienhaara said that the decision was good news for the Australian Government.226 
Professor Tania Voon from Melbourne Law School has warned of the danger of further 
investor disputes against the Australian Government.227 Glyn Moody commented that, just 
because Australia won its plain packaging case against Philip Morris does not mean that 
corporate sovereignty is not a threat.228 Lori Wallach observed that ‘Australians saw more than 
$50 million of their tax dollars go to legal costs to defend against the attack, according to World 
Health Organization Director General Margaret Chan’.229 
 
Professor Tania Voon and Professor Andrew Mitchell from the University of Melbourne 
commented on the outcome: ‘Australia’s win on jurisdiction offered a political boost to 
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countries implementing or considering standardized tobacco packaging, but the circumstances 
of Philip Morris’ investment in Australia may not be mirrored elsewhere.’230 
 
B. Philip Morris vs. Uruguay 
 
Graphic health warnings have proven to be an effective nudge in terms of behavioural 
economics to encourage consumers to avoid tobacco use.231 
 
Australia is not unique in being targeted by tobacco companies under investment treaties.  
 
Philip Morris has also used international investment rules to challenge Uruguay’s restrictions 
on cigarette marketing.232 In particular, the tobacco company has complained about graphic 
health warnings being used by the Uruguay Government, lamenting: ‘Many of these 
pictograms are not designed to warn of the actual health effects of smoking; rather they are 
highly shocking images that are designed specifically to invoke emotions of repulsion and 
disgust, even horror.’233 Philip Morris protest: ‘The 80 per cent health warning coverage 
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requirement unfairly limits Abal’s right to use its legally protected trademarks, and not to 
promote legitimate health policies’.234 
 
Matthew Porterfield and Christopher Brynes comment on the matter: ‘Philip Morris’s 
challenge to Uruguay’s tobacco regulations raises a number of fascinating (although not 
entirely new) issues concerning international investment law, including the scope of fair and 
equitable treatment, the use of most favored nation (MFN) provisions to invoke more lenient 
procedural standards, and the availability of injunctive relief in investment arbitration.’235 
 
In 2010, international lawyer and practitioner in investment treaty arbitration Todd Weiler 
stated: 
 
PMI’s BIT claim against Uruguay is emblematic of its long standing strategy to vehemently oppose the 
adoption of measures that might some day lead to plain paper of their products, or other measures that 
substantially interfere with the use and enjoyment of its crucial investment in its tobacco brands.” He 
added that “the claim is nothing more than the cynical attempt by a wealthy multinational corporation 
to make an example of a small country with limited resources to defend against a well-funded 
international legal action.236 
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Benn McGrady provides a thoughtful analysis of the ramifications of the dispute.237 
 
Philanthropists Mike Bloomberg and Bill Gates launched a joint legal fund to assist developing 
countries in legal battles with the tobacco industry over trade and investment.238  Michael 
Bloomberg noted: ‘We are at a critical moment in the global effort to reduce tobacco use, 
because the significant gains we have seen are at risk of being undermined by the tobacco 
industry’s use of trade agreements and litigation.’239 He observed: ‘We will stand with nations 
as they work to protect their populations against the deadly health effects of tobacco use.’240 
Bill Gates maintained: ‘Country leaders who are trying to protect their citizens from the harms 
of tobacco should not be deterred by threats of costly legal challenges from huge tobacco 
companies.’241 He extolled Australia’s leadership in respect of the plain packaging of tobacco 
products: ‘Australia won its first case, which sends a strong message’.242 He feared that 
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‘smaller, developing countries don’t have the same resources.’243 The Anti-Tobacco Trade 
Litigation Fund aims ‘to combat the tobacco industry's use of international trade agreements to 
threaten and prevent countries from passing strong tobacco-control laws’. 244 
 
Uruguay prevailed in the final ruling in the Investor-State Dispute Settlement conflict with 
Philip Morris.245 The 304 page arbitration ruling by Professor Piero Bernardini and Judge 
James Crawford (including a dissent by Gary Born) is long and complex. The Tribunal 
ultimately rejects the arguments of Philip Morris. For instance, it rejects the arguments of the 
tobacco company that its trade mark rights entitle it to block the introduction of graphic health 
warnings: 
 
The Claimants argue that it is a commitment that arises when a submitted registration application is 
granted under Uruguayan law “to an individual person or entity.” 
Yet, a trademark is not a unique commitment agreed in order to encourage or permit a specific 
investment. Unlike the case of an authorisation or a contract, where the host State may undertake some 
specific obligations, Uruguay entered into no commitment “with respect to the investment” by granting 
a trademark. It did not actively agree to be bound by any obligation or course of conduct; it simply 
allowed the investor to access the same domestic IP system available to anyone eligible to register a 
trademark. While the trademark is particular to the investment, it stretches the word to call it a 
“commitment.” 
In addition, the scope of any such commitment remains uncertain. As compared to a contract, 
where the host State enters into specific, quantifiable obligations in relation to an investment, a 
trademark is not a promise by the host State to perform an obligation. It is simply a part of its general 
intellectual property law framework. A trademark gives rise to rights, but their extent, being subject to 
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the applicable law, is liable to changes which may not be excluded by an umbrella clause: if investors 
want stabilization they have to contract for it. 246 
 
In conclusion, the Tribunal ‘concluded that trademarks are not “commitments” falling within 
the intended scope of Article 11 of the BIT’. 247 The Tribunal found: ‘Accordingly, the 
Claimants’ claim of breach by the Respondent of Article 11 by the adoption of the Challenged 
Measures is rejected.’248 
 
In essence, the Tribunal dismissed the claims of Philip Morris. The Tribunal asked the 
claimants to pay to the Respondent an amount of $7 million on account of its own costs, and 
shall be responsible for all the fees and expenses of the Tribunal and ICSID’s administrative 
fees and expenses. 
 
The World Health Organization published a press release, noting that the ‘International tribunal 
upholds states’ rights to protect health through tobacco control.’249 The international 
organisation noted that the Tribunal accepted submission of an amicus brief from the World 
Health Organization on ‘the basis that it provided an independent perspective on the matters in 
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the dispute and contributed expertise from “qualified agencies”.’250 The World Health 
Organization noted: ‘The Tribunal subsequently relied on the brief at several points of the 
factual and legal analysis in their decision.’251 
 
‘The health measures we implemented for controlling tobacco usage and for protecting the 
health of our people have been expressly recognized as legitimate and also adopted as part of 
the sovereign power of our republic,’ Uruguayan President Tabare Vazquez said in a televised 
speech.252 
 
For its part, Marc Firestone of Phillip Morris maintained: ‘We've never questioned Uruguay's 
authority to protect public health, and this case wasn't about broad issues of tobacco policy’.253 
He asserted: ‘The arbitration concerned an important, but unusual, set of facts that called for 
clarification under international law.’254 
 
Action on Smoking and Health (ASH), the oldest anti-tobacco organization in the United 
States, applauded Uruguay for winning the case, but said Phillip Morris ‘accomplished its 
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primary goal.’255 Laurent Huber commented that Phillip Morris ‘will no doubt shed some 
public crocodile tears, but their main goal in launching the suit has been realized, six years and 
millions of dollars have been spent defending a nondiscriminatory law that was intended purely 
to protect public health.’256 She lamented: ‘This has already resulted in regulatory chill in other 
countries, preventing tobacco legislation that would have saved lives.’ 
 
Professor Tania Voon and Professor Andrew Mitchell from the University of Melbourne noted: 
‘The tribunal’s decision on the merits in the Uruguay case, on the other hand, provides evidence 
of investment tribunals’ ability to accord appropriate weight to sovereign regulatory objectives: 
“investment tribunals should pay great deference to governmental judgments of national needs 
in matters such as the protection of public health”.’ 257 However, the researchers noted that ‘the 
existence of a partial dissent in that case highlights continuing uncertainties.’258 
 
The McCabe Centre for Law and Cancer has published a longer analysis of the dispute between 
Philip Morris and Uruguay.259 The McCabe Centre commented: ‘The decision is a resounding 
victory for Uruguay, and for the right to regulate for public health more generally’. The 
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McCabe Centre reflected upon the dispute: ‘The Tribunal’s decision emphasises the policy 
space that states have under international investment treaties and affirms that it is not the role 
of international tribunals to second-guess states’ regulatory decisions on complex public policy 
matters.’260 The McCabe Centre also noted that the decision ‘also makes a number of more 
general statements about evidence, rights and obligations at issue that will resonate in other 
contexts, including in respect of tobacco industry claims that tobacco control measures breach 
WTO obligations, and in domestic challenges that are brought against tobacco control 
measures.’261 
 
Cecilia Olivet and Alberto Villareal commented on the ruling: ‘So while Uruguay can celebrate 
this particular win over a corporate Goliath, perhaps the victory’s most useful contribution 
would be to raise awareness among states of the dangers of signing up to a privatised court 
system that leaves decisions on public policies in the hands of corporate lawyers’.262 They 
expressed concerns about how global law firms have aggressively pursued actions against 
nation states: 
 
The real winners in this proliferation of investor-state cases – which have surged globally from six in 
1996 to 696 now – have been the corporate law firms that work on these long and complex cases. 
Typical arbitration lawyers, employed by either the state or a corporation, earn up to $1,000 an hour. 
Philip Morris hired three international law firms (Sidley Austin, Lalive, and Shook, Hardy & Bacon), 
whereas Uruguay was represented by Foley Hoag. The three arbitrators that decided the case also 
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received wages: nearly $1m between the three of them. But more disturbing than the profits lawyers 
make is the power that they are given.263 
 
The civil society activists complained that ‘this is a case that should never have been heard as 
it contradicted both the terms of the bilateral investment treaty between Switzerland and 
Uruguay (used as the basis for the claim) as well as the framework convention on tobacco 
control – the only binding multilateral convention on public health.’264 
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THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP – THE FINAL TEXT ON TOBACCO 
CONTROL (2016) 
 
In the end, the final text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership deals with tobacco control in quite a 
minimalist way. 
 
The United States Trade Representative provides this overview of its approach to the topic of 
tobacco control: 
 
Tobacco is a product that poses unique public health challenges, as is reflected in each Party’s tobacco 
control regulations. In order to ensure that each Party has the ability to regulate manufactured tobacco 
products and protect public health, TPP, for the first time in any trade agreement, builds on structures 
established in the agreement to give each Party the right to decide that its tobacco control measures for 
manufactured tobacco products cannot be challenged by private investors under Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS). Other provisions of the agreement, including state-to-state dispute settlement 
procedures by governments, will continue to apply. This provision does not apply to tobacco leaf; under 
TPP, U.S. tobacco farmers will have enhanced opportunities to compete fairly in foreign markets by the 
elimination of foreign tariffs on tobacco leaf.265 
 
Article 29.5 of the Trans-Pacific Partnership provides: 
 
Article 29.5: Tobacco Control Measures [12] 
A Party may elect to deny the benefits of Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment) with respect to claims 
challenging a tobacco control measure[13] of the Party. Such a claim shall not be submitted to arbitration 
under Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment) if a Party has made such an election. If a Party has not elected 
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to deny benefits with respect to such claims by the time of the submission of such a claim to arbitration 
under Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment), a Party may elect to deny benefits during the proceedings. 
For greater certainty, if a Party elects to deny benefits with respect to such claims, any such claim shall 
be dismissed.266 
 
Footnote 12 provides: ‘For greater certainty, this Article does not prejudice: (i) the operation 
of Article 9.14 (Denial of Benefits); or (ii) a Party’s rights under Chapter 28 (Dispute 
Settlement) in relation to a tobacco control measure’. 267 Footnote 13 provides: ‘A tobacco 
control measure means a measure of a Party related to the production or consumption of 
manufactured tobacco products (including products made or derived from tobacco), their 
distribution, labeling, packaging, advertising, marketing, promotion, sale, purchase, or use, as 
well as enforcement measures, such as inspection, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements. 
For greater certainty, a measure with respect to tobacco leaf that is not in the possession of a 
manufacturer of tobacco products or that is not part of a manufactured tobacco product is not 
a tobacco control measure.’ 268 
 
Reading this text, it seems that only limited protection is afforded to tobacco control in respect 
of investor-state dispute settlement (if parties elect to use such protection). There is still scope 
for country-to-country disputes over tobacco control under Chapter 28 of the Trans-Pacific 
                                                          
266  Article 29.5 of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 2015 https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text 
267  Article 29.5 of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 2015 https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text 
268  Article 29.5 of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 2015 https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text 
97 
 
Partnership. The text does not provide for an over-arching recognition of the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control. 
 
Katherine Shats at the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Control provided a 
commentary upon the text on tobacco control in the Trans-Pacific Partnership.269 She noted: 
‘This kind of tobacco-specific carve-out is certainly unprecedented in the history of trade and 
investment agreements and sets a strong precedent for tobacco control and public health’.270 
Shats recognised: ‘An international trade treaty expressly recognizing tobacco products as 
uniquely harmful and tobacco control measures as requiring specific protection is an incredibly 
important step which, ideally, would set a floor for future agreements.’ Nonetheless, she 
questioned whether the text was adequate, sufficient, and comprehensive.271 
 
Katherine Shats highlights the prospect of state-to-state disputes over tobacco control under 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership: 
 
This carve-out may stop future suits by tobacco companies, but it unfortunately that’s only a part of the 
story. As a footnote to the provision makes clear, it only applies to corporations suing countries, not one 
country suing another. And as I’ve written about before, convincing and funding a government to file 
a lawsuit on their behalf is something Big Tobacco is very good at. For example, despite not actually 
being an exporter of tobacco to Australia, the Ukraine was one of five countries that sued Australia 
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alleging that its plain packaging laws breach WTO law. Why? Well we now know that British American 
Tobacco and Philip Morris paid the legal costs of at least three of the countries involved in that dispute. 
Still, the state-state dispute process does make it harder for a tobacco company to initiate claims than 
being able to sue a state directly. Many governments (including those party to the TPP) may not agree to 
bring such actions, and would face significant criticism or ridicule for agreeing to act for Big Tobacco 
so blatantly (in fact, Ukraine ended up eventually withdrawing from the lawsuit).272 
 
Shats warned: ‘Unfortunately, it still doesn’t seem like this carve-out will do anything to 
prevent these kinds of practices if they were to occur’.273 She noted: ‘Even more frightening is 
the prospect that industry could also try to dissuade some governments from opting in and 
“electing” to trigger this provision in the first place’.274 Shats makes the important point: ‘This 
entire provision rests entirely on what a government chooses to do.’275 She suggested: ‘Maybe 
TPP negotiators weren’t ready to carve-out all claims related to tobacco, regardless of whether 
they are brought by a tobacco company or a state’.276 Shats noted: ‘Though it’s very difficult 
to believe that any government that isn’t being manipulated and funded by Big Tobacco would 
genuinely want to sue another country for trying to protect its citizens from tobacco-related 
disease and death.’277 
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Ted Alcorn has also discussed trade-offs for public health under the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
in The Lancet.278 
 
Australia has said that it will avail itself of the protection for tobacco control against investor-
state dispute settlement under the Trans-Pacific Partnership.279 The nation state said: ‘Pursuant 
to Article 29.5 of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) signed in Auckland, New 
Zealand on 4 February 2016, Australia hereby elects to deny the benefits of Section B (Investor-
State Dispute Settlement) of Chapter 9 (Investment) of the TPP with respect to any claim in 
relation to its tobacco control measures. Accordingly, no claim can be submitted to arbitration 
under the TPP’s investor-state dispute settlement mechanism in respect of any tobacco control 
measure of Australia.’ Clearly, other participants in the Trans-Pacific Partnership should do 
likewise. 
 
Alfred de Zayas, the United Nations Independent Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and 
Equitable International Order, has been concerned about the use of investor clauses in respect 
of tobacco control.280 He emphasized: ‘There is no justification for the existence of a privatised 
system of dispute settlement that is neither transparent nor accountable’.281 Alfred de Zayas 
stressed: ‘Investors can have their day in court before national jurisdictions, often with multiple 
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opportunities for appeal.’282 He stressed: ‘Investors can also rely on diplomatic protection and 
state-to-state dispute settlement procedures.’283 In his view, ‘The ISDS cannot be reformed. It 
must be abolished.’284 Alfred de Zayas maintained that ‘respect for human rights must prevail 
over commercial laws’.285 In his view, ‘It is time for the UN general assembly to convene a 
world conference to put human rights at the centre of the international investment regime. In 
this context, a binding treaty on business and human rights is long overdue.’286 
 
For its part, the Big Tobacco company Philip Morris has protested that it should be able to 
bring investor actions under trade agreements against tobacco control measures.287 He has 
maintained that ‘there is no inherent tension in protecting fundamental rights of the private 
sector while protecting human rights.’288 The Big Tobacco company protests: ‘The implication 
that our case has “chilled” governments from enacting tobacco control rules is erroneous’.289 
Philip Morris argued: ‘Governments that respect the rule of law have nothing to fear from the 
possibility of independent, objective review of regulatory measures.’290  
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Philip Morris’ lawyers have also bemoaned and bewailed the restrictions on the ability of Big 
Tobacco to invoke the Investor-State Dispute Settlement regime.291 Responding to such 
evidence, Josh Wilson, the new Australian Labor Party Member for Fremantle, commented: 
‘Some believe that foreign companies should be able to influence domestic policy and that so-
called regulatory chill is not a bad thing.’292 He observed: ‘I absolutely disagree, and even the 
proponents of ISDS appearing before the committee have tended to accept there’s no value in 
or need for ISDS provisions between us and countries like the US, Japan, and Canada.’293 
 
There remains a real and present danger that tobacco companies will bring further investor 
actions in the future, or ask states to bring trade actions to protect their interests. 
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